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Abstract
Monolithic applications are gradually getting replaced by systems built after the emerging
microservice architectural pattern. Microservices are designed for failure since highly
distributed systems come with a diverse range of potential failure points. Resilience
patterns are the most effective measure to keep failures from spreading through a system
once they occur. Some companies that build many of their systems as microservices
employ approaches like Chaos Engineering in which faults are injected directly into the
production system to uncover flaws in the services’ design. But the decision making
for the selection of fault injecting experiments remains an open challenge and these
experiments take a lot of time and effort. This thesis is created in the context of the Orcas
project that aims for efficient resilience benchmarking of microservice architectures by
incorporating architectural knowledge and knowledge about the relationships between
(anti) patterns and suitable fault injection into the decision making.
An efficient way to explore those fault injection experiments could be to simulate them
before promising fault injections are conducted on the real system. That is the approach
proposed by this thesis. To achieve this, an existing microservice resilience simulator
is extended and refined to be able to accurately and realistically simulate microservice
architectures, fault injections and the circuit breaker resilience pattern. Furthermore,
an architectural model extraction approach is developed which uses tracing to gather
architectural information and condense it into automatically created architectural models
that serve as input for the simulator and the Orcas Decision Engine, which suggests the
next fault injection experiment. Finally, the work of this thesis is connected with the
Orcas Decision Engine to enable efficient and fast testing of fault injections.
In the evaluation, multiple experiments are conducted on two exemplary microser-
vice systems to investigate the accuracy of the extracted architectural models and the
extended simulator. The results of the evaluation reveal that the developed architec-
tural model extraction approach is promising, but shows some limitations due to its
employment of dynamic analysis through tracing. Furthermore, they show that the
expectations to the simulator’s accuracy are not satisfied acceptably. However, it shows
realistic behavior in terms of fault injections and state transitions of the circuit breaker
pattern during the evaluation what makes it possible to use the simulator to uncover
hidden antipatterns in microservice systems and, therefore, to assess the potency of fault
injections, what is its primary use-case in the Orcas context.
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Kurzfassung
Monolithische Anwendungen werden nach und nach durch Systeme ersetzt, die nach
dem hervortretenden Microservice Architekturmuster entwickelt wurden. Microservices
werden bereits mit einem Fokus auf Fehlertoleranz entworfen, da verteilte Systeme mit
einer vielfältigen Reihe an potentiellen Fehlerpunkten einhergehen. Resilience Entwurfs-
muster sind die effektivste Methode, um Fehler an der Ausbreitung durch ein System zu
hindern. Manche Unternehmen die viele Microservicesysteme betreiben wenden Ansätze
wie Chaos Engineering an, in welchen Fehler direkt in das Produktionssystem injiziert
werden, um sicherzustellen, dass diese Mechanismen wie angenommen funktionieren.
Doch die Entscheidungsfindung für die Auswahl von Fehlerinjektionsexperimenten ist
weiterhin eine offene Herausforderung und die diese Experimente nehmen viel Zeit und
Aufwand in Anspruch. Diese Arbeit entsteht im Kontext des Orcas Projekts, welches das
effiziente Resilience-Benchmarking von Microservicearchitekturen durch Einbeziehung
von Architekturwissen und Wissen über die Beziehungen zwischen (Anti-) Mustern und
geeigneten Fehlerinjektionen in die Entscheidungsfindung zum Ziel hat.
Eine effiziente Weise diese Fehlerinjektionsexperimente zu untersuchen könnte sein
sie zu simulieren bevor vielversprechende Fehlerinjektionen auf dem echten System
durchgeführt werden. Dies ist der von dieser Arbeit verfolgte Ansatz. Um dies zu erre-
ichen wird ein existierender Microservice Resilience Simulator erweitert und verbessert,
um realistische und genaue Simulationen von Microservicearchitekturen, Fehlerinjektio-
nen und dem Circuit Breaker Resilience Entwurfsmuster zu ermöglichen. Des Weiteren
wird ein Architekturmodellextraktionsansatz entwickelt, welcher Tracing verwendet,
um Informationen über Architekturen zu sammeln und automatisch in einem Architek-
turmodell zusammenzufassen. Dieses dient als Eingabe für den Simulator und die
Orcas Decision Engine, welche das nächste Fehlerinjektionsexperiment vorschlägt. Ab-
schließend, wird die Arbeit dieser Thesis mit der Orcas Decision Engine verknüpft, um
effizientes und schnelles Testen von Fehlerinjektionen zu ermöglichen.
In der Evaluation werden mehrere Experimente an zwei Microservicesystemen durchge-
führt, um die Genauigkeit der extrahierten Architekturmodelle und des erweiterten
Simulators zu untersuchen. Die Ergebnisse der Evaluation ergeben, dass der entwick-
elte Architekturmodellextraktionsansatz vielversprechend ist, aber Einschränkungen
aufgrund seiner Verwendung von dynamischer Analyse durch Tracing aufzeigt. Des
Weiteren ergeben sie, dass die Erwartungen an die Genauigkeit des Simulators nicht
zufriedenstellend erfüllt werden. Jedoch weißt der Simulator in der Evaluation ein
realistisches Verhalten bezüglich Fehlerinjektionen und der Zustandsübergänge des
Circuit Breaker Entwurfmusters auf, was es ermöglicht den Simulator zu verwenden, um
versteckte Antipatterns ins Microservicesystemen aufzudecken und die Wirksamkeit von
Fehlerinjektionen zu beurteilen — sein primärer Anwendungsfall im Orcas Kontext.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1. Motivation and Context
In software engineering, a pattern documents a proven recurring solution to a common
design problem [Gam95]. In a similar fashion, antipatterns document recurring solu-
tions to common problems which have negative consequences, such as lowering the
performance or reducing the resilience of a system [SW03]. Monolithic applications are
gradually getting replaced by systems built after the emerging microservice architectural
pattern, in which an application is developed as a composition of self-contained services
[FL14; New15]. But highly distributed systems come with a diverse range of potential
failure points; therefore, microservices are designed for failure and with resilience in
mind [FL14].
Resilience patterns are the best measure to keep failures from spreading further through
the system once they happen and to enable services to recover after a failure occurred
[Nyg07]. Some companies that build many of their systems as microservices go through
a lot of effort to ensure that these mechanisms work as supposed [RHB+17]. The
evaluation of resilience patterns and antipatterns in microservice architectures is cur-
rently mostly done by injecting failures into the production system and monitoring its
behavior afterwards. This approach, heavily employed by companies like Netflix, is
called Chaos Engineering [RHB+17]. One of its disadvantages is that real experiments
take a lot of time and effort [NCM16]. Especially the decision making for the selection of
experiments remains a challenge; the state of the art is to simply inject failures randomly
into the system [BBR+16].
This thesis is created in the context of the Orcas project [Orc18] that aims for efficient
resilience benchmarking of microservice architectures to improve this situation. By
incorporating architectural knowledge and knowledge about the relationships between
(anti) patterns and suitable failure injections resilience vulnerabilities should be detected
1
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Figure 1.1.: Context and open challenges.
more efficiently [HDAP18]. An efficient way to run resilience experiments could be to
simulate them on an architectural model instead of executing them on the real system,
what is the open challenge addressed by this thesis. The faultload, which is needed
for resilience testing, can be determined by the Orcas Decision Engine [HDAP18]. For
this, an architectural model needs to be extracted from the respective system to serve as
its input. Such an extraction approach is not yet integrated in the Orcas project. This
faultload can not only be used for failure injection, but together with the architectural
model also as input for a microservice resilience simulator [BGZ17], which simulates
the resilience experiments and visualizes the results.
The context of this work and the open challenges, which will be addressed in order to
meet the goals of this thesis, is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
The basis of the approach is an existing microservice application in production. The
first step is the automated extraction of an architectural model from the application,
which will serve as input for the Orcas Decision Engine and the microservice resilience
simulator. The Decision Engine then uses the architectural model to create faultloads,
which can be used in experiments on the production system or in the resilience simulator.
To execute those simulations it is necessary to extract a model of the system’s workload,
too. The architectural model and the simulation experiment, which consists of a
2
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faultload and workload model, serve as input for the simulator. After the simulation is
finished, a report is created, which helps to investigate the application’s resilience
mechanisms. Furthermore, the output created by the simulator can also be used
to improve future faultloads computed by the Orcas Decision Engine, which help to
prioritize relevant resilience experiments that could be executed on the actual system
for further evaluation.
Those faultloads can — via fault injection — just as well be used in experiments on
the real microservice system, what will be used to evaluate the results of the simulator
approach at the end of this thesis.
Two representative microservice applications will be used in the evaluation of the
approach. First, an architectural model will be extracted from the system and then
compared with an already existing or manually created model of the architecture to
inspect the extracted model for completeness and correctness. Then experiments will
be run on the real application to gather performance data that will be compared to the
results of the simulation of the same experiments. The collected datasets will then be
compared to evaluate how accurately the simulation corresponds to the real execution,
if the behavior of the simulated circuit breaker matches the actual behavior of a real
implementation of the circuit breaker pattern and how well the behavior of the simulated
system corresponds to the real system’s after failures have been injected into it.
1.2. Goals
This thesis addresses the simulation-based evaluation of resilience antipatterns in mi-
croservice architectures with focus on the extraction of architectural models and the
simulation of resilience experiments in microservice systems. The goal is to extend the
microservice resilience simulator developed by Beck et al. [BGZ17] — especially to
improve the simulation of the circuit breaker resilience pattern — and to connect it with
the Orcas Decision Engine, in order to simulate experiments that are created by the
Decision Engine. The advantage which this approach promises in comparison with other
resilience engineering and fault injection approaches for microservice systems is that
the simulation-based evaluation has the capability to investigate resilience issues in a
semi-automated and efficient way that does not negatively impact the user experience
of the production system. Furthermore, the approach helps in context with the Orcas
project to make the resilience benchmarking of microservice architectures more efficient
by contributing to a better prioritization of the relevant experiments.
3
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1.3. Research Questions and Methodology
The following research questions will be addressed in this thesis:
RQ1 How can the simulation of the circuit breaker pattern in the microservice resilience
simulator be refined to reflect the behaviour of a popular implementation of the
pattern?
RQ2 How can tracing be used to extract architectural models from microservice appli-
cations?
RQ3 Do the extracted architectural models accurately represent the real corresponding
application?
RQ4 How accurately does the simulation of a microservice system through the microser-
vice resilience simulator correspond to the execution of the real system?
RQ4.1 Does a simulated microservice system show the same behavior as the correspond-
ing real microservice system after a fault has been injected into a service?
RQ4.2 Does the simulation of the circuit breaker resilience pattern through the mi-
croservice resilience simulator correspond to the actual behavior of the real imple-
mentation of a circuit breaker?
To solve RQ1, the functionality and parameters of the most popular software library
that implements the circuit breaker pattern will be examined and compared with the
current state of the circuit breaker in the simulator. Subsequently, the simulator will be
adjusted to employ the same configuration parameters as the library and to reflect the
same behaviour during simulation.
In order to solve RQ2, state-of-the-art approaches for architectural model extraction
from microservice systems and distributed tracing tools will be studied and a new
approach that takes advantage of tracing for extracting architectural information will be
developed.
All other research questions will be explored in Chapter 6 based on various experiments
that will be conducted on two selected microservice applications. To investigate RQ3,
we will compare architectural models that have been extracted from the applications
with the developed approach with existing models of the system’s architectures. To
solve RQ4, RQ4.1 and RQ4.2, the execution of the example systems will be compared
with the output of the microservice resilience simulator under defined scenarios, e.g.,
failure injection. Additionally, supplementary material, containing software, dataset,
and results, is publicly available online [Bec18].
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1.4. Thesis Structure
This thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 – State of the Art outlines the foundation of the thesis and related work. We
briefly introduce the microservice architectural style, a collection of resilience pat-
terns and antipatterns, the microservice resilience simulator and the OpenTracing
standard.
Chapter 3 – Extension of Microservice Resilience Simulator describes the exten-
sions made to the simulator. They compromise the division of the input model into
an architectural model and an experiment model and the refinement of the circuit
breaker pattern implementation after the model of Hystrix.
Chapter 4 – Architectural Model Extraction Approach presents the developed archi-
tectural model extraction approach that uses dynamic system analysis to extract
architectural models automatically from collected OpenTracing traces.
Chapter 5 – Connection of Simulator and Orcas Decision Engine gives an overview
over the decision-making algorithm of the Orcas Decision Engine and describes
how the extended simulator and the developed architectural model extraction
approach are connected with the decision engine.
Chapter 6 – Evaluation presents the evaluation of the proposed approach and its re-
sults. Furthermore, the obtained results are discussed and possible threats to
validity are named.
Chapter 7 – Conclusion concludes the thesis by summarizing the experience and re-
sults that were gained throughout the thesis. Finally, possible future work is put in
prospect.
5

Chapter 2
State of the Art
This chapter provides a technical foundation for the rest of the thesis and presents related
work. Section 2.1 gives a description of the term resilience and explains how it is related
to availability. Afterward, Section 2.4 will detail the microservice architectural style.
Section 2.3 presents an explanation of the idea of patterns in software engineering and
defines two patterns which will be in the focus of this thesis. Subsequently, Section 2.2
describes the notion of antipatterns and defines the three antipatterns which this thesis
covers. Section 2.7 gives an overview of the extraction of architectural models from
software systems and Section 2.5 presents the microservice resilience simulator which
will be extended as part of this thesis. Section 2.8 gives an overview over the technologies
used in this thesis and Section 2.9 presents related work at the end of the chapter.
2.1. Concepts of Dependable Computing
Avižienis et al. [ALRL04] define dependability as the ability to deliver service that can
justifiably be trusted and, further, the dependability of a system as the ability to avoid
service failures that are more frequent and more severe than is acceptable. They also
define multiple attributes that make up the concept of dependability, such as availability
and reliability, and threats to dependability. The following subsections present those
definitions. Afterward, the term resilience is explained as well as how it is connected
with the concepts defined by Avižienis et al.
2.1.1. Fault, Error und Failure
A fault is an underlying flaw in a system that has the potential to cause problems. It
can be internal or external to the system. When it is activated during system execution,
7
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Figure 2.1.: Relationship between fault, error and failure, adopted from [HE17].
a fault leads to an error [HE17]. An error is the part of the total state of the system
that may lead to a subsequent failure [ALRL04]. A failure occurs if an error reaches
the service interface of a system. It results in system behavior that is inconsistent with
the system’s specification [HE17], i.e., the delivered service deviates from the system’s
correct service [ALRL04]. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between fault, error and
failure.
2.1.2. Availability, Reliability and Resilience
Avižienis et al. define availability as the readiness for correct service [ALRL04], i.e., it
defines the proportion of time a system provides a correct service [HE17].
The availability of a software system is formally defined as:
(2.1) availability = MTTF
MTTF +MTTR
Where MTTF stands for Mean Time To Failure and MTTR stands for Mean Time To
Recovery [HE17].
Reliability is defined as the continuity of correct service [ALRL04], i.e., it is the property
of a system that defines its probability to have an error or failure. It provides information
about the error- or failure-free time period [HE17].
Resilience has been defined in literature in many different ways. In this thesis, resilience
is defined after Haimes [Hai09], who defines it as the ability of the system to withstand
a major disruption within acceptable degradation parameters and to recover within an
acceptable time and composite costs and risks. That means, resilience is the ability of
a system to quickly recover from a failure either without the user noticing or with
graceful degradation of its services [Fri15]. Therefore, it is an attribute that increases
the availability of a system.
Many approaches for increasing a system’s availability usually have the goal to increase
the MTTF of different system components and, thus, try to minimize the probability of a
failure occurring. The following four categories [Lyu07] summarize common approaches
to achieving reliable software systems:
8
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1. Fault prevention: Avoid fault occurrences by design
2. Fault tolerance: Provide service complying with the specification despite faults
having occurred
3. Fault removal: Detect the existence of faults and eliminate them
4. Fault forecasting: Estimate the presence of faults and their likely consequences
Fault tolerance is a synonym for resilience [ALRL04]. In today’s complex and distributed
systems it is impossible to completely prevent failures. They are not the exception,
but rather the normal case [Fri16]. Every network call in a distributed system will
eventually fail and, therefore, should already be seen as a potential point of failure
during development [Nyg07].
Resilience does not increase availability by reducing the probability that a failure occurs;
instead, it reduces the MTTR, i.e., reducing the mean time between the occurrence of a
failure and the system’s recovery from it [Fri16].
2.2. Antipatterns
An antipattern describes a recurring solution to a common problem, but on the contrary
to design patterns (Section 2.3) this solution generates negative consequences for
the system. It is a method to map a specific situation to a general class of problems.
The definition of an antipattern usually describes the symptoms associated with the
problem as well as its underlying root cause. In addition, antipatterns provide a common
vocabulary for the discussion of problems and their solutions [BMMM98].
This thesis will confine itself to three antipatterns, which will be presented in the
following subsections.
2.2.1. Cascading Failures
A cascading failure occurs when a failure in one component of the system causes
problems in other parts of the system which call the failing component. Therefore the
failure cascades through various components of the system, amplifying the problem.
Preventing failures from cascading through the system is one of the key activities to
increase the system’s resilience. Cascading failures happen after something else has
already gone wrong. Therefore, one approach to prevent them is to use the circuit
breaker pattern at the system’s integration points, where failures are bound to happen,
to contain those failures in the component where they occur [Nyg07].
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2.2.2. Integration Points
Every integration point like sockets, RPC, or REST will fail at one point of the system’s
life cycle. To counteract this, each integrated interface has to be treated like a potential
failure point. Even worse, integration point failures are often difficult to debug at the
application layer, because they occur mostly in the higher-level transport or communi-
cation protocols. Besides, failures at integration points usually evolve into cascading
failures during the further execution of the application, if the system is not prepared
to handle them. Therefore, countering failures at a system’s integration points helps to
prevent cascading failures. This can be achieved by defensive programming and, for
instance, usage of the aforementioned circuit breaker pattern [Nyg07].
2.2.3. Slow Responses
Quick failures allow calling system components to process their call and quickly retry
the transaction or fail as well. Slow responses, however, block resources on the calling
component, which can lead to blocked threads and consequently to cascading failures.
They usually evolve from excessing demand, i.e., when no more free request handlers
are available, or happen as a system of underlying problems in the code. Slow responses
can be the manifestations of memory leaks, network congestion or full TCP receive
buffers. Hunting for these faults, using timeouts and failing fast helps to counter them
[Nyg07].
2.3. Resilience Patterns
The term pattern originates from Christoph Alexander, an architect who was the first
to divide architectural structures into different patterns in his book A Pattern Language
from the year 1977 [Ale77]. In software engineering, a pattern documents a proven
recurring solution to a common design problem. The documented solution is generally
applicable and can be elaborated for specific circumstances to fit all needs and used
technologies. It records expert knowledge to be reused and provides abstractions which
simplify the discussion about software design and implementation [SW03].
Resilience patterns are design patterns that provide architecture and design guidance
to reduce, eliminate, or mitigate the effects of faults in the system [Nyg07]. There is a
wide range of them that can be applied to microservice architectures, far too wide for
the scope of this thesis. Therefore, this work focuses on the circuit breaker and bulkhead
pattern — two popular resilience patterns described by Nygard [Nyg07] — which will be
10
2.3. Resilience Patterns
closed open
half-open
fail (thresholdreached)
reset �meoutfail
success
call
raise circuit open
fail
under threshold
success
Figure 2.2.: Circuit breaker state diagram, adopted from [Fow14].
detailed hereafter. These design patterns were selected, because they are implemented
by a popular latency and fault tolerance library [Hys18], which will be used later in the
thesis.
2.3.1. Circuit Breaker Pattern
Many software systems, e.g., microservice applications, are distributed across multiple
machines and need to make remote calls to communicate with different components.
One of the big disadvantages of distributed systems is that every remote call can fail or
hang without a response. If multiple components send calls to an unresponsive supplier
this can lead to cascading failures across multiple components, especially in highly
interconnected systems like microservices [Fow14].
The circuit breaker resilience pattern is used in distributed systems to prevent a failure
from cascading from one component to others that depend on it and eventually from
cascading through the entire system. To achieve this, remote function calls are wrapped
in circuit breaker objects which monitor the requests for failures. Once a threshold is
exceeded, the circuit breaker trips and requests are handled with a fall-back mechanism.
This gives the requested service time to recover and eventually handle requests again.
The circuit breaker checks the connection after a timeout and allows remote calls to pass
through again when the receiver answers eventually [Nyg07]. An example for this can
be found in Subsection 2.3.3.
The states and state transitions that a circuit breaker performs are illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.2.
11
2. State of the Art
2.3.2. Bulkhead Pattern
The bulkhead pattern is named after the bulkheads used in ships, which are metal
partitions that divide the ship into multiple watertight compartments. This way, if one
compartment is taking in water, the other compartments are protected and the ship does
not irrevocable sink. Similarly, by partitioning a software system, a single failure is kept
from bringing the entire system down. The most common application of the bulkhead
pattern is physical redundancy in servers or entire data centers to prevent hardware
failures from impacting the system’s availability [Nyg07]. Another common example
of the bulkhead pattern are separate thread pools. They serve the same purpose as
redundant servers. If the threads of one thread pool are consumed through a failure,
there are still threads available in the other thread pool to handle requests [Net18]. A
thread pool contains multiple threads waiting for tasks to be concurrently executed. The
advantage of maintaining a pool of threads is that latency, which is due to the constant
creation and destruction of threads, is avoided and, therefore, performance increased
[Goe02].
2.3.3. Hystrix
A popular library that implements the circuit breaker and bulkhead patterns is Hystrix1.
Its development started in 2011 at Netflix and by now it is publicly available under an
open source license. Since the company started using the library, uptime and resilience
of its services reportedly experienced a dramatic improvement. The library is designed to
give protection from latency and failures from dependencies between services and to stop
cascading failures in distributed systems. This is achieved by failing fast, enabling a quick
recovery and gracefully degrading if possible. At the same time, Hystrix also enables
near real-time monitoring of microservice applications and displays the monitored data
on a dashboard to improve operational control over the system [Net18].
Hystrix’s Implementation of the Circuit Breaker Pattern
Assuming that the volume across a dependency, that implements a circuit breaker, meets
a certain threshold and that the error percentage of that dependency exceeds the set
error percentage threshold. In that case the circuit breaker transitions from the closed
state to the open state, i.e., requests are no longer forwarded to the dependency; instead,
they are directly answered through a fall-back method. In other words, all requests
1https://github.com/Netflix/Hystrix
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Figure 2.3.: Fallback: Cache via Network, adopted from [Net18].
made against the circuit breaker get short-circuited while it is open. After a defined
amount of time, the next single request is let through and the circuit breaker transitions
into the half-open state. If the request fails, the circuit breaker returns to the open state
for the duration of the sleep window. Otherwise, if the request succeeds, the circuit
breaker transitions back to the closed state and requests are sent to the dependency as
usual [Net18].
To use Hystrix’s implementation of the circuit breaker, network calls and other operations
that can fail are wrapped inside a HystrixCommand object. The object has a run method,
which executes the critical network call or operation. If an exception is thrown inside
this method, the HystrixCommand object falls back to an alternative fallback method,
which lets the operation degrade gracefully. The fallback method can also return a new
HystrixCommand object, e.g., if the fallback operation can also fail. In that case, the new
object must also provide a fallback method, as shown in Figure 2.3 [Net18].
2.4. Microservice Architectural Style
The microservice architectural style [New15] has been becoming popular throughout
the past years and many organizations migrated their systems away from monolithic
architectures towards microservices [BHJ16]; Amazon, Netflix, and The Guardian
being among the pioneers [FL14]. This section will provide a brief explanation of the
architectural style as a foundation for the remainder of the thesis.
In short, a microservice application is developed as a composition of decentralized,
self-contained services that are independently deployed and communicate with each
other through lightweight protocols, often HTTP. Furthermore, each service is developed
around a business capability and can be written in a different programming language,
which allows every development team to maintain their own technology stack. Each
13
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Figure 2.4.: An examplary microservice architecture.
service only has to adhere to the API requirements, otherwise the choice of technologies
is flexible. Microservices are independently deployable through a fully automated
continuous deployment pipeline [FL14]. Figure 2.4 shows an examplary microservice
architecture. There is no formal definition of microservices; instead, in literature, they
are often characterized by certain aspects and principles, e.g., by Fowler and Lewis
[FL14], Rajesh RV [Raj16] and Newman [New15]. Various of these aspects have already
been mentioned in the above explanation. We will now go into greater detail about the
two that are the most important in the context of this thesis.
2.4.1. Autonomous Services
A system is often designed into several technological layers, e.g., presentation layer,
business layer and database layer [Raj16]. Teams are created around these layers,
too, leading to UI teams, server-side logic teams and database teams [FL14]. This
is an example of Conway’s Law, which says that "any organization that designs a
system will inevitably produce a design whose structure is a copy of the organization’s
communication structure" [Con68]. Microservices on the other hand are developed
around business capabilities. A single service has its own user interface, logic and
database and is consequently developed by a cross-functional team, which includes
all the skills necessary to develop such a service [Raj16]. This also means that, while
monolithic systems usually employ one large database to store all the application data,
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most services maintain their own database with the data that is relevant for themselves
[FL14].
Furthermore, no application logic should take place within the system’s communication
mechanisms, but exclusively in the microservices, to keep them independent and loosely
coupled with the rest of the system. Therefore, HTTP requests and REST are most
commonly used to implement lightweight communication between the various services.
This use of standard protocols, as they are also used to build the world wide web, enables
the services to be interoperable with each other [Raj16].
2.4.2. Design for Failure
Microservice systems are highly distributed systems. This brings a whole range of
potential failures with it, that developers have to prepare for. Any service call could
fail at anytime due to unavailability of the called service or high network latency.
The services need to be designed in a way that they can respond to the failure of
services as gracefully as possible. The handling of such service failures adds additional
complexity compared to traditional monolithic systems and is another disadvantage of
the microservice architectural style. As a consequence, development teams constantly
reflect on the repercussions of service failures on the user experience of the application
[FL14]. An example for this is Netflix, who developed their Simian Army, a tool that
randomly disables microservice instances in production, to make sure the system is
prepared to survive the failure without customer impact. This goes along with monitoring
of each service (Section 2.8.2) to detect failures as quickly as possible and to possibly
automatically repair the faulty service [Net11].
Therefore, microservices are designed to be particularly resilient. One way to increase the
resilience of a service is to implement the resilience patterns introduced in Section 2.3,
which help to contain failures in the service they’re occurring.
2.5. Microservice Resilience Simulator
We developed a microservice resilience simulator in our paper Simulation-based Resilience
Prediction of Microservice Architectures [BGZ17], that is capable of simulating microser-
vice architectures and failures of one or multiple service instances of the architecture and
the repercussions of such a fault for the rest of the system. Furthermore, the simulator
can also simulate the integration of certain resilience patterns like the circuit breaker
pattern and, therefore, allows an investigation of the effectiveness of a systems resilience
mechanisms.
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Figure 2.5.: UML class diagram illustrating the input model of the microservice re-
silience simulator [BGZ17].
The simulator was built using the Java-based Desmo-J framework, which allows the
development of simulation models and, furthermore, supports discrete-event simulation
as well as process-oriented simulation. It was created by the University of Hamburg in
1999 and has since been constantly maintained with updates [Uni17].
The simulator will be extended as part of this work to also support latency failure modes,
besides, the simulation of the circuit breaker pattern will be improved and further
parameters will be added to depict the resilience pattern more realistically.
As part of the simulator we developed an input model, which allows for an abstract
description of microservice architectures, including services, service operations, service
dependencies and applied resilience patterns. Further, the model contains meta infor-
mation about the experiment as input for the simulator. It is also possible to define
chaos monkey objects, that describe, which service instances should fail and when in the
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simulation that is supposed to happen. Figure 2.5 gives an outline of the input model in
the shape of an UML class diagram.
Instances of the input model are declared in the JSON format, an exemplary configura-
tion can be found in Listing 2.1. Lines 2 to 9 contain meta data about the simulation.
After that, the microservices of this example architecture are listed in lines 10 to 26.
Following that is the specification of the request generators for this experiment in lines
27 to 32 and the specification of a chaos monkey in lines 33 to 38, which will shut down
a service instance of the frontend service during the simulation.
The implementation of the circuit breaker pattern in the simulator will be refined in
Chapter 3 and further parameters for this pattern will be added to the input model.
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1 {
2 "simulation": {
3 "experiment": "experiment_name",
4 "model": "simulation_model_name",
5 "duration": 200,
6 "report": "",
7 "datapoints": 200,
8 "seed": 1234
9 },
10 "microservices": [
11 {
12 "name": "frontend",
13 "instances": 2,
14 "capacity": 1000,
15 "spatterns": [{"name": "Thread Pool", "arguments": [10, 5]}],
16 "operations": [
17 {
18 "name": "login",
19 "demand": 100,
20 "opatterns": [{"name": "Circuit Breaker", "arguments": [2, 3]}],
21 "dependencies": [
22 {
23 "operation": "save",
24 "service": "logic",
25 "probability": 0.1
26 }]}]}],
27 "generators": [
28 {
29 "time": 0.1,
30 "microservice": "frontend",
31 "operation": "login"
32 }],
33 "chaosmonkey": [
34 {
35 "microservice": "frontend",
36 "instances": 1,
37 "time": 50
38 }]}
Listing 2.1: An instance of the input model of the simulator.
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2.6. Fault Injection
Software fault injection is a method to anticipate worst-case scenarios caused by faulty
software through the deliberate injection of software faults. It can be used for assessing
and improving resilience mechanisms in software systems. The approach is to inject
faults or software-, hardware-, or environmental-related errors into the system. Three
aspects need to be considered when injecting a fault: what to inject, where to inject and
when to inject. There are three important properties for fault injection: representativeness,
usability (the ability to use fault injection in a new target system), and efficiency (ability
to achieve useful results with a reasonable experimental effort). A fault injection system
usually compromises a load generator, which sends inputs to the target system that will
processed during a fault injection, and an injector, which introduces a fault in the system.
The inputs and faults submitted to the system are referred to as workload and faultload.
A fault injection campaign is formed by the execution of several experiments or fault
runs. Typically, only one fault is injected per experiment. Another component of a fault
injection system is the monitor entity. It measures data from the target system that
allows the tester to assess the outcome of the experiment; whether the injected fault has
been tolerated or the system has failed. In order to make that assessment, measured
data is usually compared with data obtained from fault-free experiments. All three
named components of a fault injection system are orchestrated by a controller, which is
also responsible for storing the results of an experiment for later analysis [NCM16].
2.6.1. Chaos Engineering
Netflix engineers have developed an approach called Chaos Engineering [BBR+16] to
build confidence in the capability of a distributed software system to withstand disruptive
events that affect production environments. They define four principles of Chaos
Engineering: (i) build a hypothesis around steady state behavior, i.e., hypothesize that
a defined steady state will continue during resilience experiments, (ii) vary real-world
events, i.e., any event capable of disrupting the steady state is a potential variable in a
chaos experiment, (iii) run experiments in production, (iv) automate experiments to
run continuously. Experiments are run in production to provide a realistic environment
and workload to the experiment. The harder it is to disrupt the steady state, the more
confidence is built in the behavior of the system. Chaos Engineering is applied by
organizations such as Netflix, Amazon, Google, Microsoft and Facebook [BBR+16].
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2.6.2. Fault Injection in Microservice Systems
Netflix developed the Netflix Simian Army [Net16] to induce various kinds of failures
into their Amazon Web Services cloud infrastructures. Some of the simians introduced
by Netflix the Chaos Monkey, which randomly shuts down production instances, Latency
Monkey, which induces artificial delays in the system’s communication layer, and Chaos
Gorilla, which simulates an outage of an entire Amazon availability zone [Net11].
Similar tools are available for Microsoft Azure [Nak15].
In those approaches, the faults are injected randomly; the decision making of what
experiments to run is stated as an open challenge [BBR+16].
2.7. Architectural Model Extraction
The microservice resilience simulator described in Section 2.5 requires a model as input
that contains architectural information. The same applies to the Orcas Decision Engine
[HDAP18]. At the moment, those models are created manually by hand. But the creation
of architectural models is a tedious and error-prone task and models of complex systems
can quickly grow vast and unclear [BHK11]. As described in Section 2.4, services
of a microservice application are deployed continuously by independent teams. That
means that the overall architecture of such a system undergoes frequent changes; an
architectural model that represents the system must be adapted regularly. Gathering
the necessary information is a challenging task, due to the independent nature of
development teams that create and maintain services. The answer to these issues is
to automatically extract architectural models from the system. The extraction process
can be divided into three disciplines. The system’s structure and behavior need to get
extracted, which includes the system’s components, the available resource landscape
and all inter-component interactions. Furthermore, a resource demand estimation
has to take place, where resource demand is the amount of hardware resources that
are needed to process a unit of work like user requests or system operations. And
finally, a workload characterization has to be conducted, for the extracted model to
give an accurate representation of the system’s usage profile. An extraction approach
needs to solve all those three problems in order to correctly represent the real system
[BHW+15].
2.8. Technologies
This section provides an overview over the technologies that are used in this thesis.
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2.8.1. Docker
Docker2 is a software platform that performs operating-system-level virtualization.
It packages software into standardized units called containers that contain software
libraries, system tools, code and runtime. Containers are isolated but can communicate
with each other trough defined channels. They are more lightweight than virtual
machines, because they virtualize the operating system of a host instead of virtualizing
physical hardware. Multiple containers share the OS kernel of the host machine, each
running as isolated processes [Doc18].
Docker Compose is a tool for defining and running multi-container Docker applications.
A single file can be used to configure all the services of an application. They are created
and started with a single command. Docker Compose allows for multiple isolated
environments on a single host and preserves volume data when containers are created
[Com18].
Both microservice applications used in the evaluation of the thesis (Chapter 6) run in
Docker environments.
2.8.2. OpenTracing
There are many benefits to the switch from old monolithic systems towards microservice
architectures. Services can be changed and deployed independently without impacting
the rest of the application what gives their developers more individual freedom, a single
service is organized around one business capability, which makes it easier to understand
it since it represents only a small piece of functionality, microservices can be efficiently
scaled, etc [FL14]. But once a system is split into multiple services and, therefore, makes
the transformation to a distributed system, some previously simple tasks suddenly grow
more complex, like latency optimization, debugging of backend failures or analysis of
the communication between different system components [OT18].
Distributed tracing systems like Zipkin or Dapper try to address these issues [SBB+10].
Tracing is similar to logging and collects information about a program’s execution. This
information can be used for debugging purposes and to track the path that transactions
take as they propagate through a distributed system [Dav95; Sig16]. But the downside
of these tracing implementations is that their APIs are incompatible with each other
[OT18]. Since another characteristic of microservices is that each developer team can
choose their preferred technology stack for their service, especially also the programming
2https://www.docker.com/
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language [New15], developers should not be limited in their choice by the particular
distributed tracing implementation they are using [OT18]. Also, it is unreasonable to
assume that all software packages included in a project use the same tracing vendor. In
this case the traces would be incomplete and may miss function calls that are crucial for
understanding or debugging a transaction [Sig16].
This is where OpenTracing3 comes in. It is an open standard that offers consistent,
vendor-netral APIs for many popular platforms and makes it easy to switch between
tracing implementations with only marginal configuration changes [OT18]. With Open-
Tracing, development teams of services or software packages can instrument their code
with the tracing implementation of their choice, as long as it supports the OpenTrac-
ing standard, and the implementations from different tracing vendors will be able to
understand each other [Sig16].
To understand how tracing works and which standards OpenTracing provides we will
now look into what a trace is in OpenTracing.
Trace
A trace [BL94] represents a transaction as it propagates through a system, which might
be distributed. In OpenTracing, a trace is a directed acyclic graph of spans, which are
named and timed operations that represent a coherent segment of work in that trace
[OT18]. A span encapsulates the following state: an operation name, a start timestamp,
a finish timestamp, a set of span tags and span logs that contain information about the
span, a span context and references. A span may reference zero or more other spans that
are causally related to it [OTS1818]. In a distributed trace, each service contributes its
own span or even multiple spans. For instance, both the client and the server represent
their respective role in the workflow of a remote call as at least one span. A span can
also start child spans, either in serial or parallel [OT18].
Figure 2.6 visualizes what the basic trace of a transaction in a distributed application
looks like. The first illustration shows the directed acyclic graph of spans, which makes
it comprehensible how various services in the system are dependent on each other. A
drawback to this kind of visualization is that time durations do not become apparent
and that it does not scale well once more remote calls are undertaken in a transaction.
The second illustration depicts the trace in a timeline; this kind of visualization is more
useful in most cases. It adds the context of time, the hierarchy of the called services and
it shows if operations are called in a serial or parallel manner [OT18].
3http://opentracing.io/
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Figure 2.6.: Basic trace visualized in different ways.
Scope of Standardization
OpenTracing allows developers to instrument their services and packages with the
tracing implementation of their choice by standardizing three main activities during
tracing. First, it offers a standard for span management. It provides programmatic APIs
to start, finish and decorate spans. Second, it standardizes inter-process propagation
by defining programmatic APIs to aid in the transfer of tracing context across process
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boundaries. And third, it offers standardized active span management. That means APIs
to store and retrieve the currently active span across package boundaries in a single
process. Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 2.7, OpenTracing provides the standards
that are needed for distributed tracing in microservice applications, including software
packages and other third-party code, while giving developers the freedom of choosing
their preferred tracing implementation or even to switch to another implementation
with only a minimum of configuration changes needed [Sig16].
2.8.3. Jaeger
Jaeger4 is one of the distributed tracing systems that implements the OpenTracing stan-
dard. It was originally developed by Uber Technolgies before it was released as open
source and is now — just as OpenTracing — hosted by the Cloud Native Computing
Foundation. Jaeger can be used for distributed context propagation, distributed transac-
tion monitoring, root cause analysis, service dependency analysis and performance and
latency optimization [Ja18].
Figure 2.7.: OpenTracing offers standardized APIs for tracing [Sig16].
4https://www.jaegertracing.io
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Jaeger’s backend is implemented in Go, while the tracing system also features a UI
created with React.js. In terms of storage it supports in-memory, Cassandra and Elas-
ticsearch stores. Jaeger’s architecture is built with scalability and parallelism in mind
[Šab18b].
Figure 2.8 portrays the architecture of Jaeger. The client, which is integrated in the
instrumented application, sends traces to the agent, which listens for inbound spans and
informs the client about the used sampling strategy. The agent routes the obtained spans
to the collector, which validates, transforms and stores the spans. The query service
offers a REST API through which the tracing data in the storage can be accessed. The
Jaeger UI uses this query service to present the tracing data [Shk17].
Users can use the UI to search for traces and filter the results after specific services or
operations. As shown in Figure2.9, it supports different visualizations for traces, like a
time sequence, a directed acyclic graph and a critical graph diagram [Shk17].
Figure 2.8.: The architecture of Jaeger [Shk17].
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Figure 2.9.: A single trace in the Jaeger UI.
2.9. Related Work
This section presents approaches that are related to the topic of the thesis. Subsec-
tion 2.9.1 focuses on an approach for extracting architecture models from microservice
systems, followed by an approach for architectural analysis of microservices via pat-
terns in Subsection 2.9.2. Subsection 2.9.3 gives a short overview over two additional
simulation tools in addition to the discussed microservice resilience simulator.
2.9.1. Architecture Extraction from Microservice Systems
Granchelli et al. [GCD+17] present an approach for recovering the architecture of
microservice-based systems and a prototypical implementation of said approach named
MicroART. It is able to automatically extract the architecture of a microservice-based
system from a GitHub repository that contains its Docker-based source code and a
reference to the Docker container engine that manages it. Their approach consists of
two phases that are illustrated in Figure 2.10. Namely they are the architecture recovery
phase, that creates an architecture model, and the architecture refinement phase, which
outputs a refined architecture model.
The architecture recovery phase is based on the extract-abstract-present paradigm. In the
extraction phase, information is extracted from artifacts like source code, documentation
or the architect’s knowledge. The abstraction phase is about grouping and filtering
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Figure 2.10.: Architecture extraction approach by Granchelli et al., adopted from
[GCD+17].
the obtained information to get a focused set of information. At last, presentation is
about organizing the information in a clear way. The resulting, automatically generated,
architecture model then gets refined in the second phase, namely the architecture
refinement phase. This phase is semi automatic, because it requires intervention by
a software architect. Its purpose is to produce another architecture model which the
architect considers more significant for its purposes. This refined architecture model
has several advantages, e.g., for obtaining different views of the system’s architecture
customized on specific components. Granchelli et al. also developed a meta-model for
describing extracted microservice architectures, which does a good job at displaying
dependencies between services Granchelli et al. [GCD+17].
2.9.2. Architectural Analysis of Microservices via Patterns
Rombach [Rom17] proposes a microservice architectural template catalog. He docu-
ments different microservice-specific architectural patterns and their characteristics, as
well as their influences on software systems, and maps these on formalized architectural
templates. The catalog contains the patterns API gateway, client-side load balancing, ser-
vice discovery and circuit breaker. As another contribution, he extends parts of SimuLizar,
a simulator for self-adaptive systems, see Section 2.9.3, to allow for customized behavior
specification interpretation. He conducts a case study to evaluate how the developed
architectural templates help software architects. The results showed that analysis with
architectural template instances provide accurate prediction results, but there is still
potential for further enhancement [Rom17].
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Figure 2.11.: SimuLizar architecture, adopted from[BBM13].
2.9.3. Simulation of Cloud-based Systems
Palladio Component Model
Palladio is a software component model for business information systems to enable
model-driven predictions on throughput, response time and resource utilization. Com-
ponent models provide many advantages over object-oriented development approaches,
e.g., higher usability, quality and better test potential [BSG+17].
SimuLizar is an extension for Palladio, which was especially developed for systems that
change at runtime, e.g., cloud-computing and virtualized infrastructure environments.
It allows for model adaptations while the simulation is running and thereby makes it
possible to simulate self-adaptive systems like microservice applications with Palladio. At
that, SimuLizar is based on a MAPE-K feedback loop, as illustrated in Figure 2.11 as part
of SimuLizar’s architecture. The feedback loop consists of the four steps monitor, analyze,
plan and execute. A knowledge base, containing system information, i.e., a runtime model
or monitoring data, can be accessed during all steps. This allows SimuLizar to model
self-adaptive systems and to predict their performance [BBM13].
The main focus of the Palladio Component Model, however, lies with performance
investigation and not with the investigation of the resilience of a system.
CloudSim
Developed by the CLOUDS Laboratory of the University of Melbourne, CloudSim is a
framework for modeling and simulation of cloud computing infrastructures and services.
It allows modeling and simulation of large scale cloud computing data centers as
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well as modeling and simulation of application containers and virtualized server hosts
[Lab17]. The platform is written in Java and extensible, in fact, various extensions for
the framework exist. Its architecture consists of multiple layers. The fundamental layer
provides management of of applications, hosts of virtual machines, etc. while the top
layer represents the basic entities for hosts and enables the generation of requests in a
variation of approaches, configurations and cloud scenarios [BSG+17].
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Chapter 3
Extension of Microservice Resilience
Simulator
The circuit breaker pattern (Section 2.3.1) is an effective and popular resilience pattern.
By increasing the resilience of system components, it reinforces an attribute that is
particularly important in complex distributed systems. Therefore, the emergence of
microservice applications leads to an ubiquity of the circuit breaker pattern (Section 2.4).
The MiSim microservice resilience simulator is able to simulate the circuit breaker
pattern. However, when the simulator was originally developed, the pattern’s implemen-
tation in the simulator was not modeled after the implementation of the pattern in an
actual software library [BGZ17]. This means that the simulation of microservices that
implement a circuit breaker does not necessarily comply to actual metrics during the
real service’s productive execution. This chapter describes how the circuit breaker in the
simulator is refined by adapting its implementation to the mechanics and parameters of
a popular and widespread real-world implementation of the circuit breaker pattern.
3.1. Deciding on a Circuit Breaker Implementation as
Reference
The most widely used library that implements the circuit breaker pattern is probably
Hystrix [Hys18], a latency and fault tolerance library created by Netflix. This conclusion
comes from the facts that it was difficult to find any big alternatives to Hystrix at all
during the research for this thesis that do not rely in some way on Netflix’s library and
that most articles that talk about the circuit breaker pattern mention solely Hystrix as an
example implementation [Fow14; Kum18; Ric18; Tri17]. Hystrix is a library for Java,
but unofficial adaptions for other programming languages emerged, too, because of
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the lack of capable alternatives. One other system that also implements the pattern is
Finagle from Twitter [Twi18], although it is not just a fault tolerance library, but an
entire remote procedure call system. This makes it hard to use, because a development
team that wants to implement a circuit breaker for a remote operation is constraint to
rely on this technology for building the whole service. Furthermore, Hystrix’s popularity
beats Finagles by far. Finagle’s implementation of the circuit breaker works a bit different
than Hystrix’s. It includes two circuit breakers that are triggered by different events.
First, when the connection to a host fails, the system marks the host as unavailable and
does not use it until it is marked as available again. At the same time, a background
process is started that repeatedly attempts to reconnect with the host; it marks the host
as available upon success. Second, modules can mark themselves as unavailable once
the number of observed failures reaches a certain percentage value. A module that has
been marked as unavailable remains in this state for a predefined duration [Twi18].
Hystrix is far more popular than Finagle or any other implementation of the circuit
breaker pattern. In addition to that, it is available outside of any frameworks as well
as integrated in some of the more widespread Java-based frameworks [Spr18]. For
those reasons, Hystrix is used as a reference for the refinement of the circuit breaker
implementation in the microservice resilience simulator. The goal of the refinement is to
increase the accuracy and realism of the simulation.
3.2. Comparision between Hystrix’s and the Simulator’s
Implementation of the Circuit Breaker Pattern
This section discusses the differences between Hystrix’s implementation and the simula-
tor’s implementation of the circuit breaker pattern and their consequences.
3.2.1. Configuration Parameters
It is possible to configure Hystrix with a range of different parameters to adjust it
to different use-cases. The parameters that affect the circuit breaker are a timeout,
a request volume threshold, a sleep window, an error threshold percentage and the
duration of the statistical rolling window [Net18].
Timeout The timeout parameter sets the time after which the caller observes a timeout
of the operation and performs fallback logic. Hystrix records this as an error. Timeouts
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can optionally be turned off if desired. The default value for this parameter is 1000
milliseconds.
Request Volume Threshold This parameter sets the minimum number of requests that
must be sent in a rolling window before Hystrix checks if the percentage of failed requests
should trip the circuit. It exists to keep the circuit from opening on the first remote call
that fails; instead, opening the circuit should be a decision made on a statistical basis.
For example, if the value is 20, the circuit breaker will not open before 20 requests
are received, even if all received calls fail. The default value for this parameter is 20
requests.
Sleep Window When the circuit is opened, all requests will get rejected before allowing
attempts again to determine whether the circuit can be closed again. This parameter
defines the amount of time for which the circuit remains in the open state before changing
to the half-open state. Its default value is 5000 milliseconds.
Error Threshold Percentage This parameter sets the error percentage of executed
remote calls in a rolling window at which the circuit will switch into the open state and
performs fallbacks when the operation is called. Its default value is 50 percent. The
error threshold percentage only becomes relevant when the request volume threshold
is reached in a rolling window, because the circuit will not be tripped before that
happens.
Rolling Window Duration This parameter sets the duration of the statistical rolling
window. This is how long Hystrix keeps metrics for publishing, but more importantly it is
how long Hystrix keeps metrics for the circuit breaker to use. Hystrix resets the number
of successful requests, failures, timeouts and rejections for each rolling window to keep
the recorded data relevant for the decision making if the circuit should be opened. The
default value for this parameter is 10,000 milliseconds.
The circuit breaker of the microservice resilience simulator also allows for some con-
figuration, but only with the two parameters timeout and retry. The retry parameter
corresponds to the sleep window parameter of Hystrix. The lack of configuration of the
simulator’s circuit breaker is also reflected in its behaviour.
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expired
Figure 3.1.: State diagram of Hystrix’s circuit breaker.
3.2.2. Behaviour
The behaviour of Hystrix’s circuit breaker is described in Section 2.3.3. A state diagram
of Hystrix’s circuit breaker is shown in Figure 3.1. While the simulator’s circuit breaker
traverses through the same three states — closed, open, half-open — as Hystrix’s, the
behaviour varies quite a lot in some points.
Both circuit breakers initially start in the closed state. When a timeout or failure occurs
in a Hystrix Command, Hystrix executes fallback behaviour and increments the error
count for the current rolling window, but the circuit itself remains in the closed state.
The circuit only switches into the open state, when the request volume threshold and
the error threshold percentage are reached in a rolling window. If a timeout occurs
in an operation that implements a circuit breaker in the simulator, the circuit breaker
does not simulate the execution of a fallback mechanism; instead, it directly opens the
circuit, even if this is the first request to this operation that fails. This is a relatively big
difference between the two implementations that can noticeably impact the accuracy of
the simulation.
Furthermore and equally impacting on its accuracy is the fact that a bug in the simulator’s
implementation causes only the directly called operation to get bypassed with fallback
behaviour. All other dependencies that would normally be called by this operation
still get simulated, even though the operation that calls them is replaced by a fallback
method. The cause for this unrealistic functionality is a bug in the event scheduling and
the circuit breaker implementation of the simulator. All dependencies of an operation
are scheduled at the same time as the operation itself, even if the operation will get
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replaced by a fallback mechanism by the circuit breaker, because the circuit breaker only
removes the affected operation from the waiting queue.
Both circuit breakers transfer into the half-open state after a defined sleep window and
let one request through to the called operation. But Hystrix throws a timeout if the
request is not satisfied after a set time what causes the execution of a fallback, while
the simulator keeps waiting for the execution of the operation, even if the timeout is
already exceeded.
The switch from the half-open state into the closed state takes place in the same way in
both circuit breaker implementations. But when the request that was let through does
not complete in time, the simulator’s circuit breaker remains in the half-open state, while
Hystrix’s goes back into the open state and resets the sleep window.
All in all, it is evident that the implementation of the circuit breaker pattern in the
simulator differs in some impactful ways from Hystrix’s circuit breaker implementation.
This justifies a refinement of the simulator’s implementation to increase the accuracy
and realism of the circuit breaker simulation.
3.3. Modifications to the Input Model
The input model of the microservice resilience simulator, which was previously presented
in Section 2.5, contains all the information about the simulated microservice system’s
architecture as well as information about the experiment.
3.3.1. Refining the Parameters of the Circuit Breaker
The parameters of the simulator’s circuit breaker are specified in the input model as well,
therefore, the model must be refined to fit the new circuit breaker implementation. The
new model now contains the five parameters that Hystrix uses to configure its circuit
breaker, in order to give an accurate representation of it in the architectural model.
Listing 3.1 demonstrates how this looks like in the actual JSON file that contains the
architectural model.
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1 {
2 "circuitBreaker": {
3 "rollingWindow": 10,
4 "requestVolumeThreshold": 20,
5 "errorThresholdPercentage": 0.5,
6 "sleepWindow": 5,
7 "timeout": 1
8 }
9 }
Listing 3.1: The representation of a circuit breaker in the architectural model.
3.3.2. Splitting the Model into Architectural Model and Experiment
Model
Since the simulator has only one input model that contains the information about both
the architecture of the system and the experiment that is to be simulated, a new model
has to be created every time that a new experiment is to be conducted if the different
experiment models should be persistently saved. If the architectural information and
the experiment information is saved in two separate models only the experiment model
has to be saved in multiple instances. The architectural model can be reused for every
experiment as long as the architecture itself is not subject to change. In addition to this,
the architectural model and the experiment information come from different sources.
In the presented approach, the architectural model is extracted from a microservice
application, while the faultload, which is part of the experiment model, is created by the
Orcas Decision Engine. If both are contained in one model, this information needs to
be merged in an unnecessary intermediate step. Also, since the Orcas Decision Engine
takes only the architectural model as input, it would not be possible to use the same file
as input for the simulator and the Decision Engine. Because of these reasons, it makes
more sense to have a separate architectural model and a separate experiment model as
input for the simulator, instead of a single input model.
The new architectural model contains the microservices, their configuration, operations,
dependencies, etc, while the new experiment model contains information about the
experiment, like the experiment’s duration, information about sampling, the request
generators and chaos monkeys. Figure 3.2 shows the architectural model and the
experiment model with all their parameters visualized as UML class diagrams.
36
3.3. Modifications to the Input Model
Experiment Model
Simula�on_meta_data
- experiment_name: String
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(a) Experiment model
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Figure 3.2.: The experiment model and architectural model visualized as a UML class
diagram.
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3.4. Refinement of the Circuit Breaker Implementation
This section presents an overview over how the current implementation of the circuit
breaker in the simulator works, how the implementation was refined to improve its
accuracy and how the refined implementation of the circuit breaker works.
3.4.1. Current Implementation of the Circuit Breaker
Whenever the simulator schedules an operation, it checks if one of the circuit breakers
of the service, which executes that operation, should change into another state. First,
it processes which of the operation threads already exists for the longest time. Then,
it checks if that time exceeds the timeout of the circuit breaker. If this is not the case,
the circuit remains closed. If the thread life time exceeds the timeout time, the circuit
transfers to the state open. The traversal between the different states is also illustrated
in Figure 3.3.
If the circuit is already opened, the simulator checks if the sleep window is expired. If
this is the case, the circuit switches to the half-open state, otherwise it remains in the
open state. The first new thread that is added to the CPU when the circuit breaker is
in the half-open state is executed instead of handled with a fallback mechanism and
marked. When the circuit breakers are checked the next time, the simulator checks if
closed open
half-open
request �mes out
sleep window
success
call
raise circuit opensuccess
fail
expires
Figure 3.3.: State diagram of the old circuit breaker implementation.
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the request has been completed. If that is the case, it checks if the completion was faster
than the specified timeout time and puts the circuit back into the closed state if this
requirement is full filled. Otherwise the circuit remains in the half-open state.
A few other things to remark are that the simulator always assumes that a circuit breaker
is implemented by an operation, not a single dependency The circuit opens when one
of the operation’s dependencies times out, without regard to the other dependencies
that an operation may contain. Furthermore, due to a bug in the implementation,
all operations that implement a circuit breaker and that are executed on the same
microservice instance share the same circuit breaker — even though the different
operations should not effect each other. This will also be changed in the refinement of
the circuit breaker implementation. And last, the simulator does not schedule actual
fallback operations when the circuit is open. Instead, it takes the operations that would
get replaced by fallback behaviour out of the event queue and assumes that a fallback
operation would perform instantly without resource demand. This happens for simplicity,
but deviates from real behaviour and could therefore be subject of future work.
3.4.2. Refined Circuit Breaker Implementation
The first thing that was changed in the refined version of the circuit breaker implemen-
tation is that the circuit state is no longer shared by all operations, which implement a
circuit breaker, in one microservice instance. Instead, the circuit state of every operation
of that instance is saved separately. This means that a single open circuit does not lead to
all operations with a circuit breaker being dealt with by a fallback method anymore. Now
only the operations, whose circuit is actually open, are being handled with a fallback,
while the other operations are executed as normal.
Furthermore, the refined circuit breaker uses the same statistical calculations as Hystrix’s
circuit breaker in the decision making whether to open a circuit, instead of opening
the circuit as soon as a single operation times out. This is made possible by the added
parameters that were adopted from Hystrix. The simulator now checks for every thread
that runs an operation with a circuit breaker if the thread life time exceeds the timeout.
The old version of the circuit breaker implementation only checked this for the thread
which existed for the longest time. If the circuit status of that operation is closed
and the thread timed out, the simulator increments the error count in the current
statistical rolling window of this operation’s circuit breaker and executes a fallback for
this operation. Note, that this does not lead to the circuit being opened anymore, like it
did in the old circuit breaker implementation.
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Already scheduled dependent operations are not impacted when an operation is falling
back to a standard mechanism. This is, because a remote call cannot be undone once it
was sent in a real system either.
After the simulator iterated over all threads of this service instance and every circuit
breaker’s error count was updated, it iterates over all circuit breaker objects from the
operations of this instance and checks if the requirements for opening a circuit are
fulfilled. These requirements are the same as in Hystrix; a circuit transfers to the open
state if the request volume threshold is reached in the current rolling window and
the error percentage in this rolling window is higher or equal to the error threshold
percentage.
The simulator then checks for all circuit breakers of this service instance that are in the
open state if the sleep window is passed. The circuit breakers for which this is the case
are put into the half-open state.
The next step is to check if the circuit breakers in the half-open state have already let
a request pass to the called operation. If this is the case, the simulator checks if the
respective request takes already longer than the specified timeout. This is new, because
this was previously only checked when the dependent operation already completed.
By checking on the request before that the circuit breaker can switch its state earlier
without having to wait for the completion of a request that may take very long if the
respective service is unresponsive. The refined circuit breaker switches back into the
open state if the request time out, where it stays until the sleep window is passed again
If the request did not time out yet, the simulator checks if it was completed yet. If this is
the case the circuit switches into the closed state again to accept requests again.
The last step of this routine is to check if the rolling window of any circuit breaker is
exceeded. The error count and request count of the circuit breaker are reset if that is the
case and the rolling window starts anew.
If the circuit of an operation is in the open state on a service instance, the simulator does
not schedule any more of these operations on this instance. This behaviour is supposed
to simulate the fallback mechanism of Hystrix, since concrete fallback operations are
not supported by the simulator yet. But this behaviour also prevents operations from
being scheduled that are being called by an operation which is bypassed by a fallback
mechanism due to an open circuit.
All in all, these refinements made to the circuit breaker implementation of the simulator
should make for a far more realistic and accurate simulation of the circuit breaker
pattern.
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3.5. Comparison between the Old and the Refined Circuit
Breaker Implementation
In this section, the difference between the old and the new circuit breaker are demon-
strated based on a few example simulations.
The microservice architecture used for this system is the same as in the example in
Section 2.4 and consists of five services. Service A has two operations with multiple
dependencies to other services in the system. Its operation a1 is getting one request
per second in the first experiment and has a circuit breaker with the default Hystrix
configuration, except for the request volume threshold, which is four requests per rolling
window. The experiment is designed so that the operations called by a1 take longer than
the specified timeout, therefore the circuit should get opened eventually and requests
should be handled by the fallback method.
Figure 3.4a shows the response time in seconds for each operation with the old circuit
breaker implementation, where the red dots represent microservice A.
It can be seen that the response time of a1 is slightly higher than one second, yet the
old circuit breaker implementation does not open the circuit. This is because the old
implementation only counts the time in which a thread is active as its life time, the
time in which a thread is inactive and waits for a response from a called operation is
disregarded. In this case, the response time of the operation exceeds one second, while
the time in which the thread of the operation is active is shorter, because the thread is
inactively waiting for responses of calls to other services most of the time.
In comparison, Figure 3.4b shows the response time in seconds for each operation
with the new circuit breaker implementation, which was modeled after Hystrix’s circuit
breaker. Microservice A is again represented by the red dots.
The response time of a1 again exceeds the timeout of one second in the first four
calls, after which the request volume threshold of four requests is reached. The error
percentage at this point is 100%, because all four requests timed out, since the new
implementation uses the whole life time of a thread for its computations — including the
time in which a thread is waiting for the response of a remote call. This exceeds the error
threshold percentage of 50%, therefore the two requirements for opening the circuit
are met and the circuit is opened. This is visible in the diagram, because the response
time of a1 falls to zero seconds — since the simulator assumes that the fallback executes
instantly. The default sleep window of the circuit breaker is five seconds; the diagram
shows that one request was executed after that window to test if the called operation
now responds faster than the timeout. But this request also exceeds the timeout, because
the system was configured in such a way that the circuit would constantly be opened in
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(a) Old circuit breaker implementation.
(b) New circuit breaker implementation.
Figure 3.4.: Response time of each operation.
this experiment. Therefore, the circuit opens again after the request times out and starts
handling requests with a fallback mechanism anew.
In the second experiment, operation a1 of service A receives two requests per second,
putting even more load on the system. Otherwise, the architecture configuration remains
unchanged.
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(a) Old circuit breaker implementation.
(b) New circuit breaker implementation.
Figure 3.5.: Number of threads of each service instance.
This time the old circuit breaker opens the circuit, too, when the response time of a1
surpasses the two second mark. But the bug in the old implementation that caused the
simulator too keep scheduling remote calls from operations that were instead handled by
a standard fallback is clearly visible in Figure 3.5a, which shows the number of threads
in each service instance.
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Service E, which is represented by the blue triangles, gets a lot more requests than it can
handle, since the circuit breaker does not stop service A from calling its operations. As a
consequence, service E becomes even more unresponsive and keeps creating threads for
incoming requests, as can be seen in the diagram.
This bug was fixed in the new circuit breaker implementation, as can be seen in Fig-
ure 3.5b.
No more new requests are send to service E as soon as the circuit of operation a1 opens,
the service’s operations are only called when the circuit breaker is in the half-open state
to check whether the circuit could be closed again.
It can be seen that the new implementation behaves more realistic than the old circuit
breaker. A comparison with the behaviour of Hystrix’s circuit breaker is presented in
Chapter 6.
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Architectural Model Extraction Approach
Both the microservice resilience simulator and the Orcas Decision Engine require the
architectural model of a microservice application as input in order to simulate microser-
vice systems and create the faultloads needed for it. Manually creating such a model per
hand is a tedious and error-prone task and models of complex systems can quickly grow
vast and unclear. Therefore, extracting them directly from the system is a more efficient
solution that at the same time takes care of a common source of errors [BHW+15].
On the highest level of abstraction, the two kinds of architectural model extraction
approaches are static system analysis and dynamic system analysis. While static analysis
approaches focus on analyzing static data, like source files, configuration files or code
repositories, dynamic approaches rely on performance monitoring, logging and tracing
in order to achieve their goals, see Section 2.7. Often both methods are combined in
order to get an accurate architectural model, as in the approach presented by Granchelli
et al. in 2017 [GCD+17].
Section 4.1 presents the extraction approach that will be developed in this chapter and
states the reasons for selecting that approach. Thereafter, the steps of the preparatory
microservice application instrumentation are explained in Section 4.2 and the extraction
of architectural information from the collected traces is detailed in Section 4.3.
4.1. Deciding on an Extraction Approach
Extracting the architecture of a microservice system is not an easy task, because they
are often vast and complex. Services often have dependencies to other services, what
leads to a confusing network of different microservices working together [GCD+17].
Developing an architectural model extraction approach for microservice applications
can probably be a big enough task to justify a thesis for itself. Yet it is only one part
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of this thesis and, therefore, we decided to keep the approach as simple as possible.
By largely preparing the microservice system before the actual extraction it is possible
to keep the extraction approach itself straight forward and easy. For this reason we
chose to perform dynamic analysis on the microservice applications, to be specific via
tracing (Section 2.8.2), because the main effort of this approach would be to instrument
the analyzed system with a distributed tracing tool. Afterward, the actual extraction
approach must only process the recorded traces and construct the architectural model
from that data.
Why OpenTracing?
We decided to use a distributed tracing system that implements the OpenTracing standard
(Section 2.8.2) for the extraction, because it is growing to be the de facto standard for
distributed tracing. At the moment it is quickly being adopted by big vendors and small
organizations alike and on its way to become the universal tracing standard where more
and more software libraries come with built-in support for OpenTracing instrumentation
to enable distributed tracing without vendor limitations [Šab18a]. This also means that
it will be less effort to instrument microservice applications for tracing in order to extract
the architectural model from them that is required for the simulator and the Decision
Engine.
Why Jaeger?
Besides Jaeger (Section 2.8.3) there are a few other tracing systems out there that
support the OpenTracing standard, like Appdash, LightStep, Hawkular and Instana
[OT18]. While Jaeger is still fairly new it already accumulated a high number of adopters,
has a low overhead, supports dynamic sampling and is easily scalable, according to
Šabic´ [Šab18b]. Furthermore, it allows for span tags, a benefit that will prove valuable
in the developed architectural model extraction approach. And even more, Jaeger
offers client libraries for six different programming languages [Šab18b], which means it
can be used to instrument pretty much every microservice regardless of the employed
technology stack and, therefore, most microservice applications can be instrumented
with it in preparation for our architecture extraction approach. These advantages let to
the decision to make Jaeger the tracing tool of our choice, but in the end it comes down
to personal preferences, since it would have been possible to achieve similar results with
other tracing implementations of OpenTracing as well.
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4.2. Preparatory Service Instrumentation
The developed architectural model extraction approach presented in this chapter requires
the respective microservice system to be instrumented with a distributed tracing tool
that implements the OpenTracing standard as preparation for the actual extraction.
As explained above we decided to use Jaeger for this purpose. This section gives an
explanation of how a service should be instrumented to create the tracing data necessary
for the architecture extraction. Exemplary the following explanation is for services that
have been developed with SpringBoot, a framework for Java web applications. But the
process does not vary much for services implemented in another programming language
or framework, as Jaeger and OpenTracing offer client libraries for a multitude of them.
4.2.1. Creating a Tracer with Jaeger
The first thing to do when instrumenting a service with OpenTracing is to create the
tracer object that will record the traces and their spans and send them to the jaeger-agent
service. In SpringBoot this must be done in the SpringBootApplication class in a method
that creates the tracer as a Spring bean. The Jaeger client library allows a tracer to be
configured with various parameters, some of them are required for the tracer object to
be instantiated successfully. It is necessary to specify a service name, otherwise Jaeger
will throw an exception during runtime. For the extraction, this service name should be
identical with the actual name of the microservice, because it will later be used in the
architectural model. Further, the host and the port on which the jaeger-agent runs should
be specified in the tracer, if the service and jaeger are not running on the same host. In
that case the tracer also needs the jaeger sampler manager host and port to successfully
obtain the sampling strategy from the jaeger-agent. As shown in Listing 4.1, it is also
possible to read the tracer configuration from environment variables, which allows for
the creation of tracers that are not hard-coded into the service. This is especially helpful
when running services and the jaeger-agent in Docker containers, because the container
that is running the jaeger-agent must be declared in the configuration of the tracer object
as the host of the jaeger-agent, since the default host would otherwise be localhost.
@Bean
public Tracer jaegerTracer() {
Configuration config = Configuration.fromEnv();
return config.getTracer();
}
Listing 4.1: Creation of a tracer bean in SpringBoot.
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public ResponseEntity<String> fallback() {
jaegerTracer.buildSpan("fallbackMethod")
.asChildOf(jaegerTracer.activeSpan())
.startActive(true);
ResponseEntity<String> response = new ResponseEntity<String>("Fallback",
HttpStatus.OK);
jaegerTracer.activeSpan().finish();
return response;
}
Listing 4.2: Instrumenting the fallback method of a circuit breaker with Jaeger.
Once the tracer object has been created, Jaeger will record traces for any remote calls
that are annotated with the RequestMapping annotation from Spring, without any further
instrumentation of the code. It is possible to create spans for other methods as well and
inject them into the trace, if it is desired to include methods that are not annotated as
RequestMapping or that do not perform network calls.
4.2.2. Recording Circuit Breaker Implementations with Jaeger
If some or all of a services’ remote calls implement a circuit breaker, i.e., by integrating
the Hystrix library and wrapping the remote calls in Hystrix Commands, more instru-
mentation is required to record the pattern in the traces, what is essential to including
the circuit breaker in the extracted architectural model of the application.
By default, the created tracer object cannot record the implementation of the circuit
breaker pattern. Even when the circuit is opened and the fallback is executed, there
will not be an occurrence of this in the trace. One possible solution to this could be to
manually create a span in the fallback method and inject it into the trace, as shown in
Listing 4.2.
But, because of the way that Hystrix triggers the fallback method, Jaeger creates two
traces in this case. One trace contains the spans from the remote call, which was executed
and then caused the circuit to open, because Hystrix only throws an InterruptedException
in this case and has no further way of stopping the execution of a remote call that
has already sent its request. The other trace only contains the span that was manually
created in the fallback method and any other spans that could have been created as
a consequence of the fallback. Jaeger does not inject these spans into the first trace,
because it does not know that they are executed in the context of the original method
that caused the circuit breaker to open. To record an extra fallback trace is not very
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@RequestMapping(value = "/a", method = GET)
@HystrixCommand(fallbackMethod = "fallback")
public ResponseEntity<String> a() {
jaegerTracer.activeSpan().setTag("pattern.circuitBreaker", true);
jaegerTracer.activeSpan().setTag("pattern.circuitBreaker.fallback", true);
restTemplate.getForObject("http://b:8080/c", String.class);
restTemplate.getForObject("http://c:8080/e", String.class);
jaegerTracer.activeSpan().setTag("pattern.circuitBreaker.fallback", false);
return new ResponseEntity<String>("Operation a executed successfully.", HttpStatus.OK);
}
Listing 4.3: Adding span tags to record circuit breaker pattern implementations in the
trace.
helpful in the extraction of the architectural model, because we want to extract which
operations implement a circuit breaker. This data only gives us the data that an operation
of a certain service implements the pattern, therefore, another approach is needed to
include the necessary information in the traces.
Since it is not possible to connect the spans from the original operation and its fallback,
it is not needed to manually create a span in the fallback method. Instead we take
advantage of the fact that Jaeger supports an OpenTracing feature called span tags. A
span tag represents contextual metadata and consists of a sequence of key-value pairs,
where keys are strings and values can be strings, numbers, booleans or dates [Šab18a].
It is possible to manually inject tags into a span to add information to it that is relevant
for a specific request. In a workaround to include the circuit breaker data, the second
thing to do, when instrumenting a service in preparation for the architectural model
extraction, is to add span tags to the active span in every operation that implements a
circuit breaker with the key pattern.circuitBreaker and the boolean value true. If it is
also desired to record if the circuit breaker fallback method was executed, one span tag
should be added at the start of the method with the key pattern.circuitBreaker.fallback
and again the boolean value true and another at the very end of the method with the
same key and the boolean value false, as seen in Listing 4.3.
This way, the span tag will save the value false if the method executes successfully and
true if the execution gets interrupted by the circuit breaker falling back on the fallback
operation. It would also be desirable to be able to include different parameters of
the circuit breaker configuration in this way, but no apparent way of accessing them
outside of the method’s HystrixCommand annotation exists in SpringBoot. Therefore,
the parameters cannot be extracted automatically at the moment, but it would certainly
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be a target of future work to include the circuit breaker configuration in the extraction
process.
The microservice system is prepared for the architecture extraction once every service of
the application has been instrumented in this way with Jaeger. In the next step every
user-facing operation of the application must be executed at least once for Jaeger to
record the traces that will later be used in the extraction process. It does not matter
if operations are called multiple times, but it is crucial that every operation is invoked
at least once, because it is otherwise missing in the traces and, therefore, cannot be
extracted into the architectural model.
4.3. Extracting Architectural Information from Jaeger
Traces
When every service of the application is instrumented and traces for every possible
transaction in the system have been recorded, all the data that is needed for the
extraction is gathered. You can find an exemplary trace in Listing 4.4 that demonstrates
which data can be read from them, as also explained in Section 2.8.2. Please note that
some insignificant information contained in the trace is not shown in the listing to save
space. Jaeger comes with an API that can be consumed to get information about the
instrumented system and traces for the instrumented services. As part of this thesis
we created an extraction tool, written in Java, that processes this data to build the
architectural model that can be used as input for the microservice resilience simulator
and the Orcas Decision Engine. The tool cannot extract all architectural data that is
needed by the simulator, but it extracts the services, the operations of every service,
the circuit breaker for each operation and the dependencies between all the operations
and services. Other parameters of the architectural model, like the number of service
instances, resource demand, available resources in each service instance, etc, cannot
be extracted with this approach for now. Future work on the developed extraction
approach could certainly be to expand its capabilities in this regard to make it even more
comfortable to extract architectural models without having to manually insert these
parameters. They are filled with default values in the current state.
The tool first requests the names of all services from the Jaeger API. Listing 4.5 is an
example of the response by the API that gets processed by the extraction tool to get the
service names. As illustrated, the JSON response also contains the jaeger-query service
that is filtered out.
It will use this data in the architectural model, but also to send further requests to the
API. The API can also return the names of all the operations that it has saved for one
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1 {
2 "traceID": "8f833961ebe3c8b7",
3 "spans": [
4 {
5 "traceID": "8f833961ebe3c8b7",
6 "spanID": "2b52e0ef905d327c",
7 "operationName": "a1",
8 "references": [
9 {
10 "refType": "CHILD_OF",
11 "traceID": "8f833961ebe3c8b7",
12 "spanID": "8f833961ebe3c8b7"
13 }
14 ],
15 "startTime": 1532943589380000,
16 "duration": 2656,
17 "tags": [
18 {
19 "key": "pattern.circuitBreaker",
20 "type": "bool",
21 "value": true
22 }
23 ],
24 "logs": [],
25 "processID": "p1"
26 }
27 ],
28 "processes": {
29 "p1": {
30 "serviceName": "A",
31 "tags": [
32 {
33 "key": "hostname",
34 "type": "string",
35 "value": "3aa65e8e05b7"
36 },
37 {
38 "key": "ip",
39 "type": "string",
40 "value": "172.23.0.7"
41 }
42 ]}}
Listing 4.4: Examplary Jaeger trace.
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{
"data": ["jaeger-query","A","D","B","E","C"],
"total": 6,
"limit": 0,
"offset": 0,
"errors": null
}
Listing 4.5: Response from the Jaeger API that contains the names of all services.
service. The extraction tool takes advantage of this functionality in the next step, where
it sends requests for every microservice to Jaeger to retrieve their operations. With this
data it is already possible to build a model of the architecture that contains the different
services and their operations. What is still missing is the information if an operation
implements the circuit breaker pattern and the dependencies between operations. The
Jaeger API can return the dependencies between a system’s services, what is also a useful
feature, but does not give us the required inter-operation dependencies. It is necessary
to process the recoreded traces to obtain these.
It is possible to use the API to search for the traces of a specific service. The extraction
tool, again, does this for every service before iterating through the traces and reading
the spans contained in each trace. Each span contains the name of the operations that
it records and can, hence, be mapped to the operations of the different microservice.
Next, the span tags are read to determine if the operation has a circuit breaker. If that is
the case, the circuit breaker pattern will be added to this operation in the architectural
model with the default parameters from the configuration of Hystrix. After that, it is
checked whether the span contains a reference to a parent span. When this is the case
the tool looks for the parent span and the operation that maps to it and then adds a
dependency to the child operation to it. The tool iterates over all traces of every service
and over all spans of every trace and, thus, adds every dependency to the architectural
model that was called when traces were recorded. A dependency is only added once to
an operation, dependencies that were recorded in multiple spans do not lead to multiple
occurrences of the respective dependency in the model. The tool also counts the number
of hosts on which a service is running. That number is used to define the number of
instances for every service. Table 4.1 presents an overview over how the model attributes
are extracted from the information contained in the traces.
After all these steps are successfully completed the extraction tool creates a JSON file
that contains the architectural model of the instrumented microservice system. When
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Trace Architectural Model
operationName operation.name
reference dependency
pattern.circuitBreaker operation.circuitBreaker
hostname service.instances
Table 4.1.: Transformation of trace information to architectural model attributes.
required, it can also save the data that was gathered from Jaeger in a directory on the
hard drive and later read those files again to extract the architectural model anew. As
aforementioned, the model contains only default values for the parameters that cannot
be extracted directly from the system for now, but it can already be used as input for
the simulator. Though it makes certainly sense in most cases to adapt these parameters
to model the real-life conditions of the system. Nonetheless, the created model already
contains all the information that is necessary for the Orcas Decision Engine to create
resilience experiments for the system and can directly be parsed to fit the input model
of the Decision Engine. That process is described in detail in Chapter 5.
4.4. Summary and Discussion
As presented in this chapter, tracing can be used effectively to extract simple architectural
models from microservice applications, but it also comes with limitations. While it is
possible to extract services, operations, patterns and dependencies with this approach,
the preparation before the architecture extraction itself, i.e., the instrumentation of the
system’s services, can be time consuming if the system is large and composed by a grand
amount of services. On the other hand, tracing — and the OpenTracing standard — is
getting adopted by more and more development teams and organizations, especially
when they work on microservices. If a system is already instrumented for tracing only a
small configuration change would be necessary to enable the extraction of architectural
models from such a system. Therefore, this problem could become negligible over time.
Another shortcoming of the approach is the fact that the created models do only contain
default values for the parameters that are not extracted for now. This information must
be added manually, though the information that gets extracted into models with this
approach is the most critical and already meets the requirements of the Orcas Decision
Engine. Still, it would be desirable to extend the architectural model extraction in future
work to save manual steps in the model creation if the model is used as input for the
microservice resilience simulator.
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Chapter 5
Connection of Simulator and Orcas
Decision Engine
This thesis is created in the context of the Orcas project [Orc18], which has the goal of
effective resilience benchmarking of microservice architectures. Resilience benchmarking
[VMSK12] aims to assess failure tolerance mechanisms, e.g., via fault injection [NCM16].
It is not only conducted in development and staging environments but also during a
system’s production use [BBR+16]. Netflix’s Simian Army [Net16] is a popular example
of a resilience tool that is used in production. But one of the disadvantages of failure
injection is that resilience experiments take a lot of time and effort [NCM16]. Especially
the decision making for the selection of experiments remains a challenge; the state of
the art is to simply inject failures randomly into the system [BBR+16]. By incorporating
architectural knowledge and knowledge about the relationships between (anti) patterns
and suitable failure injections, Orcas aims to detect resilience vulnerabilities more
efficiently [HDAP18].
Figure 5.1 illustrates the approach of this thesis and how it fits into the Orcas project. The
Orcas Decision Engine [HDAP18] takes architectural information about a microservice
application and uses it to compute resilience experiments, i.e., it suggests operations,
based on probability calculations, for which it is most likely that a failure injection leads
to an impact on the system’s non-functional attributes. The decision engine includes
the results of those experiments into further iterations of its computations to create
more accurate results with a higher likelihood of finding resilience weaknesses in the
system. It takes a lot of effort to inject failures into a system [NCM16], that is why
the presented approach includes a connection between the decision engine and the
microservice resilience simulator. Simulating the initial experiments and using their
results as input for further iterations of the decision engine’s computations to create
more promising experiments is a faster way of gathering the necessary information
that is more efficient than injecting random failures into the real system. Instead,
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Figure 5.1.: Orcas context and solution approach.
only the resilience experiments that the decision engine deems promising after multiple
computation iterations need to be run on the system, with a higher likelihood of exposing
resilience vulnerabilities.
5.1. Orcas Decision Engine
The decision making of the decision engine is based on a Bayesian network [HDAP18].
An explanation of that type of statistical model will preempt the description of the
decision engine’s approach.
5.1.1. Bayesian Networks
A Bayesian network is a probabilistic graphical model in which different variables and
conditional dependencies between them are represented via a directed acyclic graph.
The nodes of that graph represent variables, e.g., observable quantities, latent variables,
unknown parameters or hypothesis, while edges between them represent conditional
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dependencies. Variables are conditionally independent of each other if there is no
connection between them. Behind each node is a probability function. It takes a set
of values for the node’s parent variables as input and describes the probability of the
variable that is represented by that node [Pea14].
Bayesian networks are the basis for different algorithms that perform Bayesian inference.
Bayesian interference is a method of statistical inference that uses Bayes’ theorem to
update a hypothesis once more information is available.
(5.1) P (A|B) = P (B|A) · P (B)
P (A)
Equation 5.1 states Bayes’ theorem, where P (A|B) is a conditional probability — the
likelihood of event A occurring after B is observed, also called the posterior probability
— P (B|A) is also a conditional probability and P (A) and P (B) are the probabilities of
observing A and B independently of each other. P (A) is also called the prior probability,
because it is the estimate of the probability of A prior to the occurrence of B and P (B) is
called marginal probability. The theorem describes the probability that an event occurs
or that a hypothesis is true, based on prior knowledge of conditions or variables that
might be related to it [NJ09].
5.1.2. Decision Making
The decision engine’s approach is request-based. That means each request is tagged
as either successful or failed. The input to the algorithm consists of the following
constituents [HDAP18].
• Architectural information
– ci: the criticality of an operation i
– di: the number of other operations depending on operation i
– pai,j,k: equal to 1 if pattern k is implemented in the interaction between
operations i and j, 0 otherwise
• Faultload
– etf,i: equal to 1 if fault f is injected into operation i at time step t in the
current experiment
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The output is the probability that that the hypothesis for metric m is rejected (hm = 1),
given a certain combination of the four input parameters. Equation 5.2 expresses this
formally, where n(hm = 1∧ ci∧di∧pa∧ etf,i) is the number of instances with a parameter
setting that resulted in a rejection of the null hypothesis and n(ci ∧ di ∧ pa ∧ etf,i) is the
total number of instances with that parameter setting.
(5.2) P (hm = 1|ci, di, pa, etf,i) =
n(hm = 1 ∧ ci ∧ di ∧ pa ∧ etf,i)
n(ci ∧ di ∧ pa ∧ etf,i)
The next experiment is selected through a roulette wheel selection strategy that is based
on the conditional probabilities calculated by equation 5.2. The aim of the experiment is
to reject the hypothesis that the failure injection does not influence the specified metric,
i.e., find faults in the system that impact the metric. The observation on the hypothesis
is recorded, but more than one measurement is required to calculate the conditional
probability. The random fault injection is repeated until a sufficient number of hypotheses
has been recorded. After the initial experiments with random fault injections, the next
experiment is determined by the calculated conditional probabilities. This ensures that
parameter value combinations that are more likely to reveal vulnerabilities are selected
more often for experiments [HDAP18].
5.2. Connecting the Simulator and the Decision Engine
To connect the Orcas Decision Engine with the developed architectural model extraction
approach and the microservice resilience simulator, which will simulate the experiments
suggested by the decision engine, it is necessary to transform the extracted architecture
model into the model that the decision engine understands and to map the output of
the decision engine on the operations of the respective microservice system.
5.2.1. Transformation of Architectural Information for Decision Engine
The decision engine requires architectural information in order to suggest the next
experiment. We defined an architectural model in Section 3.3 that is able to describe
the architecture of a microservice application by representing its services, operations,
resilience patterns and dependencies between operations. But the decision engine does
not need all information that is contained in this architectural model. More importantly,
it also requires some architectural information that is not directly saved in the developed
model. The decision engine takes di as input, the number of operations that depend
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1 {
2 microservices: [
3 {
4 "name": "A",
5 "operations": [
6 {
7 "name": "a1",
8 "dependencies": [
9 "service": B,
10 "operation": "b1"
11 ]}]
12 },
13 {
14 "name": "B",
15 "operations": [
16 {
17 "name": "b1",
18 "circuitBreaker": true
19 }]
20 }
21 ]
22 }
Listing 5.1: Simplified architectural model instance describing operation b1.
on an operation i, but the architectural model only states how many dependencies an
operation has to other operations. It is possible to compute di from the architectural
model by checking how many operations have a dependency to operation i. This makes
it possible to transform an extracted architectural model into the model that the decision
engine takes as input. That model also contains a parameter ci, called the criticality of an
operation i. As for now, it is not possible to obtain this parameter from the architectural
model and we will ignore it in our approach.
As an example we will take operation b1 from microservice B of the microservice
system presented in Section 2.4. Listing 5.1 shows a simplified version of an instance
of the architectural model that describes operation b1 and operation a1, which has an
dependency to b1.
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d pa h
0 1 1 0
Table 5.1.: Operation b1 represented as interaction for the decision engine.
Table 5.1 shows the respective representation of operation b1 in the decision model’s
input model for the first iteration. The first column contains an index, column d
contains the number of operations that depend on b1, column pa states if operation b1
is implementing a pattern and column h states if the hypothesis for this interaction was
rejected or not — the value is zero, because no experiments were conducted before the
first iteration.
The decision engine performs these model transformations when it is presented with
an extracted architectural model as input [HDAP18]. This concludes the connection
between the developed architectural model extraction approach and the decision en-
gine.
5.2.2. Simulation of Suggested Experiments
The result of every iteration of the decision engine algorithm is a new experiment that
should be run to gather more information about a hypothesis for the next iteration. An
example for that output is shown in Listing 5.2.
[’dependencies:1;patterns:0’]
Listing 5.2: Result of one iteration of the decision engine algorithm.
This output means that the next experiment should be a failure injection into an opera-
tion that has one other operation depending on it and does not implement a resilience
pattern.
To connect the decision engine with the microservice resilience simulator, a simple tool
was implemented that outputs the system’s operations that fulfill the specifications of the
next experiment. The program takes the architectural model and the next experiment
that was created by the decision engine as input. The program then looks for all
operations that fit the parameters of the experiment and returns them. The experiment
models needed by the simulator to run those experiments are not yet automatically
created; instead, it is necessary to manually adapt the experiment model by adding a
chaos monkey for one of the returned operations. A goal of future work could be to
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automatically create the chaos monkeys in the experiment model, too, in order to extend
the grade of automation of the Orcas approach.
5.3. Example
To illustrate the created approach as a whole we present an example based on the
microservice system illustrated in Section 2.4. The first step is to extract the architectural
model from the system, as it serves as input for the decision engine, which will suggest
an experiment to be simulated, and the simulator as well. The system’s services each
need to be instrumented with the Jaeger distributed tracing system. After this is done,
we need to record traces by executing every operation from every service at least once,
in order to create the tracing data from which the architectural model will be extracted.
Once all the necessary traces have been recorded, we execute the architectural model
extraction program that was developed as part of this thesis.
An excerpt of the created architectural model can be seen in Listing 5.3. To save space,
the excerpt does not contain the parameters of the circuit breakers. It contains all five
services and all their operations, except for one. It is not possible to execute operation
b2 of service B, because it cannot be called the user, neither is it called by any other
operation. Therefore, there is no way to record it in the traces and extract it into the
architectural model. But this should not be a problem for our experiments, since this
operation is never called during the execution of the actual service anyways.
Once we extracted the architectural model it can be transformed by the decision engine
into the model shown in Table 5.2.
When we run the decision-making algorithm with this model as input, we get the
experiment shown in Listing 5.4 as a result.
d pa h
0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0
2 1 0 0
3 1 0 0
4 1 0 0
5 1 0 0
6 1 0 0
7 1 0 0
Table 5.2.: Transformed architectural model.
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1 {
2 "microservices": [
3 {
4 "name": "A", "instances": 1, "patterns": [],
5 "capacity": 1000,
6 "operations": [
7 {
8 "name": "a1",
9 "demand": 100,
10 "circuitBreaker": true,
11 "dependencies": [
12 {
13 "service": "B", "operation": "b1", "probability": 1.0
14 },{
15 "service": "C", "operation": "c1", "probability": 1.0
16 }]},
17 {
18 "name": "a2",
19 "demand": 100,
20 "circuitBreaker": true,
21 "dependencies": [
22 {
23 "service": "C", "operation": "c2", "probability": 1.0
24 }]}]},
25 {
26 "name": "B", "instances": 1, "patterns": [],
27 "capacity": 1000,
28 "operations": [
29 {
30 "name": "b1",
31 "demand": 100,
32 "circuitBreaker": null,
33 "dependencies": [
34 {
35 "service": "D", "operation": "d1", "probability": 1.0
36 },{
37 "service": "E", "operation": "e1", "probability": 1.0
38 }
39 ...
Listing 5.3: Extracted architectural model.
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Figure 5.2.: Response times of the fault injection experiment reported by the simulator.
[’dependencies:1;patterns:0’]
Listing 5.4: Suggested next experiment.
The result tells us that the next experiment should be conducted on an operation that
has 1 other operation depending on it and that does not implement a resilience pattern.
Since this is the result of the first iteration of the algorithm, the suggested fault injection
was selected randomly.
In order to find out which operations fit this requirements, we execute the developed
tool, with the architectural model and the suggested experiment as input. The tool
outputs the operations which correspond to the required specifications, in this case that
are the operations b1 of service B, c1 and c2 of service C, d1 of service D, and e1 and e2
of service E.
From these operations, operation e1 is selected for a fault injection in this example. The
following hypothesis is formulated:
• H0: The response time of the system does not change after a fault is injected in
operation e1 of service E.
The fault injection experiment is simulated on the microservice resilience simulator,
which creates the report of the response times of the system that is illustrated in
Figure 5.2. It is obvious that the circuit breakers implemented in operations a1 and a2
of service A prevent the injected fault from impacting the response time of the system.
Therefore, hypothesis H0 is accepted, what is recorded in the observations for the next
iteration of the decision-making algorithm.
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Chapter 6
Evaluation
This chapter describes the conducted evaluation of the developed approach for
simulation-based evaluation of resilience antipatterns in microservice architectures.
Section 6.1 states the goals of the evaluation and Section 6.2 explains the methodology
that will be followed in the evaluation. After that, Section 6.3 describes the two mi-
croservice applications that are used in the evaluation, while Section 6.4 describes the
settings of the experiments that are conducted in the evaluation. The results of those
experiments are described in Section 6.5 and subsequently discussed in Section 6.6,
which also presents possible threats to the validity of the evaluation.
6.1. Evaluation Goals
The goal of the evaluation is to investigate the research questions RQ3, RQ4, RQ4.1 and
RQ4.2 that have been stated in Section 1.3. The goal of investigating these questions is
to get an understanding of how accurate the architectural models created with the de-
veloped architectural extraction approach represent the respective system. Furthermore,
to understand how accurate the results of the simulations of the extended microservice
resilience simulator are compared with the real execution of the regarding system.
RQ3 Do the extracted architectural models accurately represent the architecture of the
corresponding application?
In this evaluation, an architectural model represents a microservice architecture ac-
curately if the model contains exactly the microservices that make up the application,
the number of their instances, all their operations, every implementation of the cir-
cuit breaker pattern in an operation, and all dependencies between operations and
services.
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RQ4 How accurately does the simulation of a microservice system through the mi-
croservice resilience simulator correspond to the execution of the real system?
This research question is split into the following two sub-questions to give a better
assessment over the simulators accuracy and realism in its simulation behavior.
RQ4.1 Does a simulated microservice system show the same behavior as the cor-
responding real microservice system after a fault has been injected into one of its
services?
The goal is to investigate if both the simulated system and the executed system show
the same changes in their response times.
RQ4.2 Does the simulation of the circuit breaker resilience pattern through the mi-
croservice resilience simulator correspond to the actual behavior of the real implementa-
tion of a circuit breaker?
The simulator’s circuit breaker was implemented after Hystrix’s circuit breaker imple-
mentation. The goal is to evaluate if the simulated circuit breaker shows the same
behavior as Hystrix’s, i.e., if the state transitions of the circuit breakers correspond to
each other.
6.2. Evaluation Methodology
The evaluation is conducted on the basis of two microservice systems. To investigate
RQ3, the developed architectural model extraction approach is used to extract an
architectural model from each system. These models are then checked for completeness
and correctness by comparing them with already existing architectural models of the
systems, which were created manually. Subjects of the comparison are the represented
microservices, the number of their instances, their operations, the implementations of
the circuit breaker pattern in the operations, and the dependencies between services
and their operations.
Furthermore, a number of experiments is conducted in a lab setting in order to investigate
the remaining research questions RQ4, RQ4.1 and RQ4.2. The microservice applications
are executed in a Docker environment, as well as simulated through the microservice
resilience simulator, which was extended as part of this thesis. The architectural models
of the systems that serve as input for the simulations are created by hand to ensure
they represent the systems correctly. The system is monitored with Jaeger during each
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Generated Microservice System Library Management System
RQ3 1.1 1.2
RQ4 2.1 2.2
RQ4.1 3.1 3.2
RQ4.2 4.1 4.2
Table 6.1.: Overview over the experiments conducted in the evaluation.
experiment since the services are already instrumented with the tracing system for
the evaluation of RQ3. The recorded tracing data is compared with the data that the
simulator creates during the simulation of the same experiment. More precisely, the
response time of the operations is compared between the system and the simulation.
Two experiments are carried out for each research question, i.e., one experiment on each
exemplary system for each research question. Apache JMeter is used as a load driver to
generate HTTP requests to the services during the experiments. During the experiments
that investigate RQ4.1 and RQ4.2, faults are injected into the systems. The only fault
that can be simulated by the microservice resilience simulator in its current state is the
shutdown of an entire service instance. This is achieved by letting JMeter execute a shell
script at a specified time point during the experiment that shuts one Docker container
down in which the instance of a designated service is running. The CPU resources of
the Docker containers that run the services are limited to make it easier to model the
available resources in the simulation.
After an experiment is concluded, the response times of the different operations of the
executed system, which are saved in the recorded traces, are compared to the response
times of the operations in the simulation by investigating the differences between them.
Because the response time is the metric that is the most simple to measure and the most
relevant in the setting of this thesis, the evaluation will rely purely on the comparison of
this one metric.
Table 6.1 gives on overview over the experiments conducted in the evaluation, explaining
which research question they investigate and on which microservice system they are
conducted.
6.3. Evaluation Setup
The first microservice application used in the evaluation is a system that has been
generated using the model-based microservice architecture generation tool developed by
Düllmann et al. [Arc18; DH17]. It is the same system that has been used as an example
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Figure 6.1.: Architecture of the generated microservice system that is used in the evalu-
ation.
in other chapters of the thesis. The architecture of the generated microservice system is
illustrated in Figure 6.1.
The system is made up of five services. The operations a1 and a2 of service A can be
called by the user and have multiple dependencies to different operations from other
services. In order to investigate RQ3 and RQ4.2, operation b1 of service B and c1
of service C implement a circuit breaker with the Hystrix library. This is indicated in
Figure 6.1 by the dashed line around those operations. All services are created with
the Spring Boot framework and implemented in Java and are run with docker-compose
in Docker containers. The services have no real functionality besides calling their
dependencies since they were only generated for the use in resilience benchmarking, but
that should be sufficient for the conducted experiments. Small delays are incorporated
in the operations to give the impression of an actual workload. This microservice
system is used in the evaluation, because the model-based microservice architecture
generator was created to allow for fast and simple generation of architectures based on
the instances of a metamodel. While the resulting system is not a complex microservice
application, it provides the building blocks for experimentation with different resilience
and instrumentation mechanics. Furthermore, it provides a controlled environment for
the experiments which will be conducted in this evaluation.
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Figure 6.2.: Architecture of the library management system that is used in the evalua-
tion.
The second microservice application used in the evaluation is a small library management
system that is realized through three microservices. The architecture of the system is
illustrated in Figure 6.2. The frontend service has four operations which all have a
dependency to the authentication operation of the user service. In addition, each
frontend operation also has another dependency to an operation from either the user
service or the book service. Users can call the frontend operations to see the catalog of
books; administrators can also create new book entries, see the list of registered users
and create new users. In order to investigate RQ3 and RQ4.2, all frontend operations
implement a circuit breaker with Hystrix. The user and book service are implemented in
Node.js with the feathers.js1 framework, while the frontend service was created with
Spring Boot. This microservice system is used for the evaluation, because it is a real
system that is used productively. Nevertheless, it is not critical to any business function
and, therefore, provides a playground for experimentation. In addition to that, the
system is has a simple structure and is easy to understand. Because of that it is not
difficult to investigate the various research questions through experiments conducted
with this application. Beyond this, it gives an opportunity to test the viability of the
1https://feathersjs.com/
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developed architectural extraction approach on services that are implemented in another
programming language than Java.
6.4. Experiment Settings
This section presents a description of the settings of the various experiments that are
conducted in the course of this evaluation. To gain general, technology independent
insights on the research questions stated in Section 1.3, experiments are conducted
on two different exemplary microservice applications. Subsection 6.4.1 presents the
experiments that are conducted in order to evaluate the accuracy of the developed
architectural model extraction approach. Subsection 6.4.2 describes the experiments
that investigate the accuracy of the microservice resilience simulator. Subsequently,
Section 6.4.3 gives an overview of the experiments that evaluate the accuracy of the
simulation of fault injections. Concluding, Section 6.4.4 presents the experiments which
are conducted in order to evaluate the accuracy of the circuit breaker simulator by the
simulator.
6.4.1. Accuracy of Architectural Model Extraction Approach
An experiment is conducted on each microservice application to investigate the correct-
ness and completeness of the developed architectural model extraction approach.
Experiment 1.1
The goal of this experiment is to investigate RQ3 and to test the developed architectural
model extraction approach for completeness and correctness. The generated microser-
vice system is instrumented with the Jaeger tracing tool as described in Section 4.2.
Operation b1 of service B and operation c1 of service C implement a circuit breaker
with the Hystrix library in this setting. The system consists of two service instances
of the services A, B, and E each and of one service instance of the services C and D
each. That information should also be extracted into the architectural model. The
two user-facing operations a1 and a2 of service A are both called three times each
in order to generate traces as the basis for the extraction. Afterward, the developed
extraction tool is executed to extract the architectural model from the recorded traces.
After the model is created it is compared to the architectural model of the system that is
presented in Section 6.4. In the comparison, the completeness and correctness of the
services and their operations, the implementations of the circuit breaker pattern and the
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dependencies between operations are checked in particular. The results are presented as
a graphical visualization of the extracted architectural model similar to the illustration
of the architectural model in Section 6.3.
Experiment 1.2
The goal of this experiment is to examine RQ3 and thus the correctness and complete-
ness of the architectural extraction approach under different circumstances than in
Experiment 1.1. During development, the approach was constantly tested on a microser-
vice application whose services were implemented with Spring Boot. The purpose of
this experiment is to investigate how well the architectural model extraction works for
services that are implemented in a different programming language than Java.
The services of the library management system are again all instrumented with Jaeger
as described in Section 4.2. All operations of the frontend service implement a circuit
breaker using the Hystrix library. The frontend service runs in two instances, the users
service in three and the books service only in one service instance. That information
should be extracted into the architectural model. To create the traces that are the basis
of the extraction process, each of the four frontend operations is called three times.
Afterward, the developed extraction tool is executed to extract the actual architectural
model from the collected traces. Once the the model is created, it is compared, as the
model in Experiment 1.1, to the architectural model of the system that is presented
in Section 6.3. Again, the completeness and correctness of the services and their
operations, the implementations of the circuit breaker pattern and the dependencies
between operations are checked in the comparison of the models. As in Experiment
1.1, the extracted model is presented through a graphical visualization similar to the
illustrations in Section 6.3.
6.4.2. Accuracy of Microservice Resilience Simulator
An experiment is conducted on each microservice application to investigate the accuracy
of the microservice resilience simulator.
Experiment 2.1
The goal of this experiment is to investigate RQ4, i.e., the accuracy of the simulation of a
microservice system through the expanded simulator without any failure injections. For
this, the system is executed and monitored with Jaeger to record the response times of its
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Service Number of Instances CPU Operations with Circuit Breaker
A 2 1 GHz -
B 2 1 GHz -
C 1 1 GHz -
D 1 1 GHz -
E 2 1 GHz -
Table 6.2.: System configuration in Experiment 2.1.
operations. The services of the application run in Docker containers via docker-compose.
The scale parameter of docker-compose is used to specify the number of instances of
each service. There are two instances of the services A,B and E each and one instance of
the services C and D each. The services’ operations do not implement the circuit breaker
pattern in this experiment setting, because it is supposed to represent normal productive
execution without any anomalies. The cpus parameter provided by docker-compose is
used to assign each service instance 0.357 CPUs of the four CPUs assigned to Docker.
This should correspond to a CPU with the clock speed of roughly 1 GHz, since Docker
has four CPUs with 2.8 GHz each assigned to it. The boost speed of the host machine’s
Intel Core i7 processor is not considered in the evaluation. The configuration of the
system is also described in Table 6.2.
Apache JMeter2, an open source load driver tool, is used to generate HTTP GET requests
to the operations a1 and a2 of service A. 200 threads send one request to each operation
over a ramp-up duration of 50 seconds. This results in four requests send to both
operations per second over a duration of 50 seconds.
After the response times of the system’s operations are recorded, the same experiment is
simulated on the microservice resilience simulator. The system setting and experiment
setting correspond to the experiment conducted on the real application. The simulator
creates a report after the simulation, which contains, among other metrics, the response
time of each simulated thread. The previously recorded and the simulated response
times are compared at the end of this experiment to give an impression of the overall
accuracy of the simulator in a simulation without anomaly injections into the system.
The focus lies on comparing the changes of the response times over time and to check
whether they correspond to each other.
2https://jmeter.apache.org
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Service Number of Instances CPU Operations with Circuit Breaker
Frontend 2 1 GHz -
Users 3 2 GHz -
Books 1 1 GHz -
Table 6.3.: System configuration in Experiment 2.2.
Experiment 2.2
The goal of this experiment is to investigate RQ4, i.e., the accuracy of the simulation of
a microservice system through the expanded simulator without any failure injections.
The difference to Experiment 1.2 is that the experiment is conducted with a system that
was not only generated for resilience experiments, but that is actually used productively.
This leads to a higher workload than in Experiment 1.2, because the services do not
solely call dependencies, but also have to make different computations.
The services of the library management system also run in Docker containers via docker-
compose. In the setting for this experiment there are two instances of the frontend
service, three instances of the user service and one instance of the book service. The
user service has the most instances, because every operation of the frontend service is
dependent on the authentication operation of the user service, which needs relatively
much computational power compared with the other operations. In this setting, none of
the operations implements the circuit breaker pattern. The cpus parameter provided by
docker-compose is again used to limit the processor resources of every service instance.
Each instance of the frontend and book service has 0.357 CPUs assigned to it. That
corresponds to a CPU with the clock speed of approximately 1 GHz. Every instance of
the user service has 0.714 CPUs assigned to it, was corresponds to a CPU with about 2
GHz. The configuration of the system is also described in Table 6.3.
As in the other experiments, Apache JMeter is used as the load driver in the experiment. It
generates HTTP GET requests to the operations users, createUser, catalog and createBook
of the frontend service. 30 threads send a request to the catalog, createBook and
createUser operation each over a ramp-up period of 50 seconds. That amounts to one
request sent to each of those operations every 1.67 seconds. At the same time, 20
threads send a request to the users operation over a ramp-up period of 20 seconds, what
results in one request sent to the operation every 2.5 seconds.
The same experiment is simulated on the microservice resilience simulator and the
recorded response times from the real execution and the simulation are compared to
determine how accurate the simulation is.
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{
"service": "E",
"instances": 1,
"time": 10
}
Listing 6.1: Specification of a chaos monkey in the experiment model of the simulation.
6.4.3. Accuracy of Fault Injection Simulation
An experiment is conducted on each microservice application to investigate the accuracy
and realism of the behavior of the microservice resilience simulator during fault injections
into the simulated system.
Experiment 3.1
The goal of this experiment is to investigate RQ4.1, i.e., if the behavior of the simulator
after fault injections is realistic and corresponds with the behavior of the real system.
The experiment setting is the same as for Experiment 1.2, save for the failure injection.
The injected failure is the shutdown of one instance of service E after 10 seconds in the
experiment. Service E is chosen for the failure injection, because service E receives a
high workload since multiple dependencies of the called operation a1 of service A are
depending on it. The shutdown of one of service E’s instances should cause an increase
in the overall response times, because one service instance should be overwhelmed by
the number of incoming requests.
The service instance is shutdown through a script that is executed from a thread that is
started at the tenth second of the experiment by JMeter. The script shuts down one of
the Docker containers that runs a service instance of service E. The response times of
the systems operations are again recorded with Jaeger.
For the simulation, a chaos monkey is specified in the experiment model, as shown in
Listing 6.1, that shuts one service instance of service E down after 10 seconds.
Again, the measured and simulated response times are compared. The main focus is
to test, whether the failure injection leads to an increase of the response times in the
simulation, as it does in the real execution of the system. Furthermore, the purpose of
this experiment is also to probe if the increase of the response times after the failure
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injection starts at the same time and happens at the same rate during the experiment in
both the simulation and the real execution.
Experiment 3.2
The goal of this experiment is to investigate RQ4.1, i.e., if the behavior of the simulator
after a fault injection corresponds to the behavior of the real system. Its purpose is once
again to investigate the accuracy of the simulator when the simulated system is not only
a generated application without actual workload.
The experiment setting is the same as for Experiment 2.2, except for the failure injection.
The injected failure is again the shutdown of a service instance. After 10 seconds, one
instance of the user service, which receives the heaviest load, is shut down. This should
have an effect on the response time of every operation of the frontend service, since
they all depend on the authentication operation of the user service.
As in Experiment 3.1, the service instance is shut down through a shell script that is
executed by JMeter. A chaos monkey is specified in the simulation’s experiment model
again to achieve the same in the simulator.
The purpose of this experiment is also to examine if the increase of the response time of
the operations after the failure injection in the simulation corresponds to that during
real execution.
6.4.4. Accuracy of Circuit Breaker Simulation
An experiment is conducted on each microservice application to investigate the accu-
racy and realism of the circuit breaker implementation in the microservice resilience
simulator.
Experiment 4.1
The goal of this experiment is to investigate RQ4.2, i.e., the behavior of the refined
circuit breaker implementation in the simulator. Subject of the examination is especially
the state transitions of the circuit breaker and the question if they occur corresponding
to the implementation of the circuit breaker in the Hystrix library.
The experiment setting is for the most part unchanged from Experiment 3.1, except
that two of the system’s operations now implement a circuit breaker, as shown in
Table 6.4. Operation b1 of service B and operation c1 of service C both depend on
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Service Number of Instances CPU Operations with Circuit Breaker
A 2 1 GHz -
B 2 1 GHz b1
C 1 1 GHz c1
D 1 1 GHz -
E 2 1 GHz -
Table 6.4.: System configuration in Experiment 4.1.
Parameter Value
rolling window 10000ms
request volume threshold 4
error threshold percentage 0.5
sleep window 5000ms
timeout 1000ms
Table 6.5.: Configuration of the circuit breakers implemented in operations b1 and c1.
operations of service E. When one instance of that service is shut down through a
failure injection, the remaining service instance cannot handle the load of the incoming
requests from operations b1 and c1. That should lead to increased response times of
the two operations. Implementing a circuit breaker in those operations should lead to a
timeout in that scenario, what means that the circuit breaker falls back to a standard
response. If too many requests to the operations time out the circuit is opened and all
requests are handled by the fallback mechanisms, i.e, keeping response times low. The
circuit breakers of both operations are configured with the same parameters, which are
described in Table 6.5.
The circuit breakers are also added to the architectural model that is used as input for
the simulation in this experiment. The focus of the comparison of the measured and
simulated response times is to see if the circuit breaker implementation in the simulator
changes the circuits’ states in the same manner and at the same time as Hystrix’s circuit
breakers. Also, to investigate if the simulator’s circuit breaker has the same effect on the
response times of the operations and the overall distributed transactions as the one in
Hystrix.
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Service Number of Instances CPU Operations with Circuit Breaker
Frontend 2 1 GHz users, createUser, catalog, createBook
Users 3 2 GHz -
Books 1 1 GHz -
Table 6.6.: System configuration in Experiment 4.2.
Parameter users, catalog, createBook createUser
rolling window 10000ms 10000ms
request volume threshold 3 3
error threshold percentage 0.5 0.5
sleep window 5000ms 5000ms
timeout 2000ms 4000ms
Table 6.7.: Configuration of the circuit breakers implemented in the operations users,
catalog, createBook and createUser.
Experiment 4.2
The goal of this experiment is to investigate RQ4.2, i.e., the behavior of the refined circuit
breaker implementation in the simulator. Especially, if the circuit state transitions also
correspond to those of the real circuit breaker in a system that has an actual workload.
Save for the added circuit breakers the experiment settings remains unchanged from
Experiment 3.2. Table 6.6 shows the system configuration used in this experiment,
including which operations implement the circuit breaker pattern. The configuration of
the different circuit breakers can be seen in Table 6.7.
The focus of the comparison of the measured and simulated response times is to see if
the circuit breaker implementation in the simulator changes the circuits’ states at the
same time as Hystrix’s circuit breakers, in this system, too.
6.4.5. Evaluation Environment
All experiments are conducted in a Docker (v18.06.0-ce-mac70) environment that got
assigned four CPUs and 8196MB of RAM in total. The system on which Docker is running
is a MacBook Pro 15" 2015 model with a quad-core 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7 processor
with 16GB of RAM. The machine is running macOS High Sierra v10.13.3. The Java
services of the microservice systems are instrumented with the Jaeger java client library
v0.27.0. The Node.js services of the library management system are instrumented with
77
6. Evaluation
the Jaeger node client library v3.11.0. Spring Cloud Starter Hystrix v1.4.5 is used for the
implementation of the circuit breaker pattern. The load driver used in the experiments
is Apache JMeter 4.0.
6.5. Description of Results
Subsection 6.5.1 describes the results of the experiments made to investigate RQ3. Sub-
sequently, Subsection 6.5.2 presents the results of the experiments made to investigate
RQ4. Subsection 6.5.3 details the results of the experiments conducted in order to
investigate RQ4.1 and Subsection 6.5.4 describes the results of the experiments carried
out to investigate RQ4.2. The dataset containing all metrics that have been recorded in
the course of the evaluation is publicly available at [Bec18].
6.5.1. Accuracy of Architectural Model Extraction Approach
Figure 6.3 shows a graphical visualization of the architectural model that was extracted
from the generated microservice system during Experiment 1.1, using the approach
presented in Chapter 4.
The model contains all five services of the application and the correct number of service
instances for each service. All operations have been extracted, save for operation b2 of
service B. Except for the one dependency of that operation, all dependencies between
operations have been extracted correctly, too. The dashed lines around operation b1 of
service B and operation of service C indicate that the operations implement a circuit
breaker. So the information about the implemented patterns has been extracted correctly,
as well.
Figure 6.4 shows the graphical visualization of the extracted architectural model of the
library management system that was obtained in Experiment 1.2.
This model also contains all services of the application and the correct number of service
instances for each service. While all operations of the frontend service have been
extracted, the operations that the model extracted for the users and the books service
deviate from their operations that are specified in the architectural model presented in
Section 6.3. Instead of the operations get and create, the books service is represented
with a single operation, named books. The dependencies of the operations catalog and
createBook of the frontend service point to those two operations point to the books
operation in the extracted architectural model. While the users service is represented
with the authentication operation, its get and the create operations are also replaced by
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Figure 6.3.: Extracted architectural model of the generated microservice system visual-
ized as a graph.
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Figure 6.4.: Extracted architectural model of the library management system visualized
as a graph.
one operation, called users. The former dependencies to get and create now point to
the users operation. The circuit breakers of the frontend operations have been correctly
extracted into the architectural model.
79
6. Evaluation
6.5.2. Accuracy of Microservice Resilience Simulator
The response times that have been measured and simulated during Experiment 2.1
are visualized in Figure 6.5. Figure 6.5a shows the response time of each operation
in seconds that has been measured on the real system during the experiment over a
duration of 50 seconds. The microservice resilience simulator does not display the
response time of each operation in its report. Instead, it displays the response time in
seconds of each thread of every microservice instance. This is visualized in Figure 6.5b.
As can be seen in Figure 6.5a, all operations of the real system experience a spike in their
response times during the first seconds. This is most likely due to some initialization
procedures of the services. The response times decline until approximately the third
second from where on they stay on the same level for the rest of the experiment with
some minor variations. For example, the response time of operation a1 varies between
1.1 and 1.4 seconds in this period, that of operation a2 corresponds to 0.2 to 0.4
seconds. The different presentation of the response time by the simulator makes it a
bit difficult to compare its values with the response times of the real operations, but
a closer look on Figure 6.5b allows for some differentiation of the values of different
service instances. The response times of the threads executed on the instances from
service A can be grouped into two areas. Some threads have a response time between
0.8 to 1.1 seconds while others take on response times between 0.3 to 0.5 seconds.
Those two areas likely correspond to the different response times of operations a1 and
operation a2. In comparison with the measured response times of all operations from
the real execution of the system the simulated response times are consistently off by a
few hundred milliseconds. Since not all thread response times of Figure 6.5b allow a
conclusion on the operation response times, we refrain from a precise comparison of the
gathered values of the real execution and the simulation of the system. Instead, we will
take a look at the development of the response times over time.
While the values of the real system have some slight, irregular variation, the variation
of the values from the simulation is recurring and builds a pattern. The response
times of both the real system and the simulation stay consistent throughout the whole
experiment duration and experience neither a drastic increase or decrease. Even though
the simulated response times are not completely accurate, they correspond to the
development of the real response times in that matter.
The findings from Experiment 2.2 match those from Experiment 2.1 despite the different
workload in the library management system. The response times reported by the
simulator in Experiment 2.2 also do not accurately match those recorded in the real
system, but the evolution of the response times in the simulator does correspond to that
of the real response times in this experiment as well. The related plots can be found in
Appendix A
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Figure 6.5.: Response times recorded during Experiment 2.1.
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6.5.3. Accuracy of Fault Injection Simulation
Figure 6.6 presents the response times that have been measured and simulated during
Experiment 3.1. After ten seconds, one instance of service E was shut down in this
experiment. It is visible in Figure 6.6a that the response times of the two operations of
service E increases severely as a consequence. This propagates to the other operations
that depend on service E. It can be observed that the response times of operations c1,
b1 and a1 soars as well. Astonishingly, the response times fall again around second
13 before they rise again a few seconds later. Around 22 seconds into the experiment
and twelve seconds after the service instance was shut down, the response times of
the aforementioned operations go back to the values before the failure. The expected
behavior would have been for the response times to keep rising, because the single
instance of service E should not have been able to handle the load of incoming requests
by itself. We have not found a satisfactory explanation as to why the operation times
decrease again after some seconds; the same findings were recreated when the same
experiment was conducted again.
As shown in Figure 6.6b, the simulated response times of operation e1, e2, c1, b1 and a1
rise as well after one instance of service E was shut down by a simulated chaos monkey.
Before that, the response times in the simulation again correspond approximately to
those of the real system. The increase of the response times after the service instance
shutdown during the first seconds is slower than it is on the real system, but it is still
distinct. Unlike in the real execution, the response times of the mentioned operations
keep rising after the failure. While this is the expected behavior, it does not correspond to
the unusual behavior of the real system. Hence, no meaningful findings on the accuracy
of the simulation of fault injections trough the microservice resilience simulator can be
made in this experiment.
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Figure 6.6.: Response times recorded during Experiment 3.1.
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The response times that have been measured and simulated during Experiment 3.2 can
be seen in Figure 6.7a. Again after ten seconds, a service instance was shut down. This
time an instance of the users service, which has many dependencies from the frontend
service on it. The response times of the getUsers and createUser operations of the
frontend service experience a severe increase right after the failure. The response time
of the getUsers operation even soars higher than 10 seconds. In the simulation, the rise
of the corresponding response times is slower. Shortly after the failure, the affected
operations’ response time is still around five seconds.
The response time of the books operation of the books service is unaffected by the service
instance shutdown since it has no dependencies to the users service. This is accurately
simulated in the simulator.
Wile the affected response times rise in both the real system and the simulation, the
increase of the real response times is steeper than in the simulation. 30 seconds into
the experiment, the real response time of the createUser operation is about 22 seconds
and the one of the getUsers operation around 15 seconds. The response time of the
authentication operation is around twelve seconds at this point. In the simulation, the
response time of the frontend threads is around eight seconds and the one of the users
service’s threads is around the same value. The values for the users operation of the
users service correspond to each other since its real response time is also round five to
eight seconds. But in total, this means that the discrepancy between the simulation’s
response times and the real response times is roughly seven to 14 seconds. While the
simulated response times do not accurately reflect the measured response times of the
system’s operations, an increase can be seen in both recordings. The increase does not
happen at the same rate, but the simulation reflects the general behavior of the real
system after the service instance shutdown.
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Figure 6.7.: Response times recorded during Experiment 3.2.
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6.5.4. Accuracy of Circuit Breaker Simulation
In Experiment 4.1, a circuit breaker is implemented in operations b1 and c1 to keep the
response time of operation a1 at an acceptable level. The configurations of the circuit
breakers and the experiment setting are described in Section 6.4.4. Figure 6.8 visualizes
the measured and simulated response times during the experiment.
Figure 6.8a shows that the response time of operation e1 and e2 rises drastically to
almost 6 seconds after the failure of the microservice instance. In contrast to Experiment
3.1, where this caused an increase in response time for operations c1, b1 and a1 as well,
the response times of those operations only experience an increase of a few hundred
milliseconds. This is caused by the circuit breaker implemented in operation b1 and c1
which executes the specified fallback mechanism of the operations after the timeout of
one second. As observed in Experiment 3.1, the response time of the affected operations
goes back to normal again some seconds after the service instance shutdown, but the
effect of the circuit breaker could be observed during the few seconds in which the
response times spiked.
The response times in the simulation are presented in Figure 6.8b. As in the real system,
a spike in the response time of service E’s operations can be seen directly after the service
instance is shut down. However, some of the threads of service A and service B also
have a response time of around three seconds, which should not be the case because of
the circuit breaker in operation b1 and c1. It can be observed, that the circuits of those
circuit breakers change to the open state at around the time point of 15 seconds because
no more requests are sent to service E in the next five seconds and the response times
of the threads of all services are low. At around 20 seconds, the circuits change into
the half-open state and a trial request is sent. This trail seems to fail since the response
time of most threads remains low and only a few requests are sent to service E. At 33
seconds, instance 0 of service B opens its circuit again. This can be observed based on
the increase in response times of services A, B, and E. The remaining instance of service
E seems to be able to handle the requests sent by only one instance of service B. As soon
as the second instance of service B starts to send requests again around second 39, the
response times go up again until that instance of service B opens its circuit in operation
b1 again.
In conclusion, the behavior of the simulated circuit breaker is not very accurate, as
some threads still experience high response times even though their requests should
experience a timeout. Later, the simulated circuit breaker stops a cascading of the failure
of a service instance of service E to other services, by opening its circuit. But the findings
of the experiment are inconclusive due to the inexplicable decrease of the response
times in the real system. Because of that, no full comparison between the real and the
simulated circuit breaker could be undergone.
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Figure 6.8.: Response times recorded during Experiment 4.1.
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Figure 6.9 visualizes the measured and simulated response times during Experiment 4.2.
The setting of the fault injection and the circuit breaker configuration is described in
Section 6.4.4
Figure 6.9a shows that the authentication operation of the users service experiences
a drastic increase in its response time of up to ten seconds. The response time of the
users operation also rises to approximately six seconds over the course of the next ten
seconds. The response time of the createUser operation does not pass the four second
mark, as per specified timeout of its circuit breaker. After several timed out requests, one
of the two frontend instances opens the circuit of the createUser operation at around
20 seconds. This is visible by the response times of the operation jumping between
almost zero seconds and four seconds. It can be observed that the response times of
the authentication and users operations sink while the circuit is opened. The getUsers
operation times out during every request as well and can be seen in the figure with
a constant response time of two seconds. This is because even obtaining the fallback
response of the operation takes that amount of time. The createBook and getCatalog
operations of the frontend open their circuit on once service instance at respectively 19
and 22 seconds, as the createUser operation does. This can also be deducted by their
jumping response times.
Figure 6.9b shows the response times of the service threads in the simulation. After the
service instance of the users service is shut down at ten seconds, the users threads do
not experience a rise in their response times as drastic as the authentication operation
does in the real system. Their response times are about four to five seconds. Over the
next seconds those response times rise as in the real system to around six to seven
seconds, although that happens a bit slower than it does in the real system. It can again
be noted that some of the frontend threads have a higher response time than the two
or respectively four seconds of the timeout specified in the circuit breakers. While the
circuits of the frontend operations open at around 20 seconds, the same happens in the
simulation at about 25 seconds in the experiment. This can be seen by the decline of
the response times of the frontend operations as well as of the operations of the users
service. Some threads have a response time of only a bit more than zero seconds while
others have response time of around one or three seconds, depending on the operation
they execute. This indicates again that only the circuits of one frontend instance have
been opened.
Overall, while the accuracy of the simulated response times is not spot on, the behavior
of the simulated circuit breaker corresponds to that of the real circuit breaker. The
response times may not be exactly the same and circuit state transitions happen delayed
from the real circuit breaker, but they offer a sufficient perception of how the circuit
breaker acts during real system execution.
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Figure 6.9.: Response times recorded during Experiment 4.2.
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6.6. Discussion of Results
This section provides a discussion of the previously described findings of the conducted
experiments.
6.6.1. Accuracy of Architectural Model Extraction Approach
Based on the results of Experiment 1.1 and Experiment 1.2, the developed architectural
model extraction approach works well for services implemented with Spring Boot. Except
for once operation, the architecture of the system was completely and correctly extracted.
Since collected traces are the basis of the extraction approach, it is not possible to extract
information about operations that were not executed and, therefore, not included in the
traces. It could be difficult to call every operation in a big and complex microservice
application with possibly hundreds of services. Thus, this case exposes a not insignificant
weakness of the developed approach. Since it is build on the basis of dynamic analysis
this weakness cannot be revised — to extract an operation it must be called first during
the preparation phase for the extraction.
Furthermore, Experiment 1.2 uncovered another weakness of the approach. Due to the
way that feathers.js works [Fea18], CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete) are
always handled by one single operation. This might be the case in other frameworks,
too. The only way to differentiate which operation is called in the background is by
examining the HTTP method of the request. This could be possible future work in
order to improve the approach when used to extract architectural models from services
implemented with feathers.js.
The developed approach could also be extended to extract more of the architectural
information that is needed by the microservice resilience simulator, like the resources
available to a service instance or the resource demand of an operation.
6.6.2. Accuracy of Microservice Resilience Simulator
Based on the results of the experiments that investigated RQ4, RQ4.1 and RQ4.2, the
general accuracy of the simulator is rather bad, as simulated response times deviate from
real response times by several hundreds of milliseconds to up to multiple seconds. These
differences are bigger and more noticeable after fault injections, when the simulated
response times rise at a different rate than their real counterparts.
Due to the simulator reporting response times for finished threads instead for oper-
ations, it was difficult to precisely compare the response times of the real system to
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those of the simulated system. When it was possible to identify the response times of
individual operations in the thread response times, the aforementioned findings can be
concluded.
The evaluation was made more difficult by the unexpected development of the measured
response times in Experiment 3.1 and Experiment 4.1. For an unknown reason, the
response times of the operations affected by the fault injection settled down again after
some seconds, what is not the previously expected behavior. The fact that all of the
services of the system used in the experiments were running on one machine made
it difficult to limit the amount of resources available to the Docker containers. An
unexpected resource distribution could have led to more resources than specified being
allocated to the remaining service instance of service E and, thus, be responsible for the
inconclusive findings of these experiments.
It was shown that the simulated circuit breaker does not consistently handle requests,
which time out while the circuit is closed, with the specified fallback mechanism, what
leads to an unrealistic high response time of some threads. This behavior does not
correspond to the implementation of the circuit breaker in Hystrix.
These findings indicate poor accuracy of the simulations, what is not surprising, as
the simulator and the architectural model disregard some aspects of real microservice
environments, such as network latency, and the estimation of the operations resource
demands is difficult and imprecise. All of these aspects present opportunities for fu-
ture work to improve the simulation accuracy. Nevertheless, while the response times
were not exactly precise, they never contradicted the behavior and the development of
response times in the real systems. During the first two experiments without fault injec-
tions, response times stayed at the same level, as they should have. If the inexplicable
findings from Experiment 3.1 and Experiment 4.1 are disregarded, the effects of fault
injections were clearly observable in a distinct increase in response times. While this
increase did not happen at the same rate or to the same extend as in the real system,
it was still distinct and illustrated the existence of an antipattern in the architecture,
namely slow responses and cascading failures. And even though the simulation of the
circuit breaker pattern did not exactly mirror the circuit breaker of the Hystrix library,
because time outs did not lead to fallbacks in every case and circuit state changes
happened slightly delayed from the real system, it still demonstrated the general effects
that the implementation of such a resilience pattern has on change of response times
after a failure. The findings of Experiment 4.2 show that the simulated circuit breaker
went through the same state transitions as the real one. In addition, when the circuit of
an operation opened only on one service instance, the simulator reflected that behavior
correctly in the simulation.
In conclusion, the simulator does not offer the best accuracy during the simulation of
microservice architectures. But its behavior corresponds to that of the real respective
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system. This holds true for the behavior of a system after fault injections and for the
behavior of the simulated circuit breaker pattern. Thereby, the simulator is not able to
precisely predict the metrics of system execution through simulations. But that is also not
the focus of the approach. The focus lies on the evaluation of resilience antipatterns in
microservice architectures and the findings of the evaluation indicate that the simulator
fulfills these requirements. The simulator can be used to efficiently assess the potency of
fault injections and, therefore, achieves its goals.
6.6.3. Threats to Validity
As this evaluation was conducted in a lab experiment, there are several threats to validity
that are discussed hereafter.
Internal
Both microservice applications used in the evaluation have a rather simple structure and
are small in size compared with real microservice systems. Due to those limitations, the
structure of the systems might not be representative of a real microservice system. All of
the system’s services were executed on the same machine, what does not represent a real
microservice environment, which usually runs on a cloud platform. Furthermore, the
estimation of the operations’ resource demands in the architectural model is not precise.
This could lead to inaccuracies of the presented results. Since the Docker containers,
which ran the microservices, were all executed on a real machine, it was a difficult task
to limit their access to the hosts computing resources. The attempt made through the
docker-compose configuration file does not guarantee precise resource limitations. This
could be observed in Experiment 3.1 and Experiment 4.1. The microservices of the
generated microservice system did not have a real workload, therefore, they might not
be representative to the behavior of real microservices.
External
In terms of the applicability of the results of this evaluation on the real world, the
evaluation could only represent parts of real microservice environments. The scale,
complexity, and structure of the used microservice applications is not representative of
actual microservice systems. The execution of the services in a Docker environment is
also not representative to the execution of real microservice systems on multiple hosts
or in the cloud. Since the generated load and the injected faults were chosen because
they demonstrate the effect of successful fault injections and the circuit breaker pattern
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quite clearly, they might not be representative to general fault injections or the effects
that the circuit breaker pattern has on a system.
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Conclusion
In the conclusion, the thesis is summarized and the overall outcome is discussed.
Additionally, possible future work is presented.
7.1. Summary
This thesis proposes an approach for effective simulation-based evaluation of resilience
antipatterns in microservice architectures in the context of the Orcas project. The
implementation of the circuit breaker pattern in the microservice resilience simulator
was refined to correspond to the implementation of the circuit breaker of the popular
Hystrix library. In connection to that, the input model of the simulator was split into two
separate models. An architectural model that contains information about the system
that is simulated and an experiment model that contains meta information about the
experiment to be simulated on the system. Parameters have been added to the model
of the circuit breaker to give a realistic representation of the configuration of Hystrix’s
circuit breaker. Furthermore, an architectural model extraction approach was developed,
which is based on service instrumentation via Jaeger and OpenTracing. The traces that
are collected during system execution are used to extract architectural information into
a model. That information compromises the microservices of the systems, the number of
their service instances, and their operations. Furthermore, it extracts the information
if an operation implements the circuit breaker pattern and the dependencies between
services and their operations. Concluding, the work of this thesis was connected with
the Orcas Decision Engine to enable the efficient assessment of the potency of fault
injections recommended by the decision engine.
The supplemental material for this thesis is publicly available at [Bec18].
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7.2. Discussion
The results of the evaluation showed that the developed architectural model extraction
approach is promising, although it highlighted some of its weaknesses as well. Because
the extraction is based on the collected Jaeger traces, operations must be executed in
order to be represented in the architectural model. In vast and complex applications this
might prove difficult. Operations that are not executed do not appear in the extracted
model. Another finding of the evaluation was that the approach does not take the used
HTTP method of requests into account. This can lead to incomplete representation of a
service’s operations if they are only differentiated by the used HTTP method, but not by
the called operation.
The findings of the evaluation indicated that the accuracy of the microservice resilience
simulator is rather imprecise. Differences in response times off multiple hudreds of
milliseconds to seconds were revealed between the simulation and the real system
execution. But the results of the evaluation also showed that the overall behavior of the
simulator represents real microservice systems sufficiently. Fault injections induce the
real increase of response times that corresponds vaguely to that measured in the real
system. The simulated behavior of the circuit breaker pattern, while not being completely
accurate, matches the behavior of the real circuit breaker implementation in Hystrix.
Both the simulated and the real circuit breaker traversed the same state transitions in
the evaluation. Thereby, the developed approach can be used to evaluate resilience
antipatterns in microservice architectures and to efficiently asses the effectiveness of
fault injections recommended by the Orcas Decision Engine, in order to select faults for
the injection in the real system.
7.3. Future Work
This section presents potential future work that could be pursued to improve the
developed approach.
7.3.1. Microservice Resilience Simulator
Many potential aspects came up during the thesis that could be pursued in future work
in order to improve the microservice resilience simulator. The simulator’s accuracy
could be improved by including more detailed properties for the modeling of a service’s
available resources or the resource demand of an operation. Latency could be added
to the simulation to make it more realistic. Furthermore, automatic scaling of service
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instances could be integrated into the simulator to give a more realistic environment
that corresponds more to the cloud environments in which microservice systems are
hosted. Service instances that have been shut down by a simulated chaos monkey could
recover after some time, to represent a system with self-healing services. To add to this,
other failure modes besides the failure of en entire service instance could be added to
the simulator. One example for such a failure mode could be latency that is injected into
the connection between two services.
7.3.2. Architectural Model Extraction Approach
The focus of future work could be put on extending the attributes that the developed
approach extracts from microservice applications. Such attributes could be the resource
configuration of a service instance or the automated recognition and extraction of the
resource demand of an operation. At the moment, this information must be manually
added to an extracted model before it can be used as input for the simulator. In addition
to that, static code analysis could be included in the approach to be able to also represent
operations in the architectural model that were not recorded in collected Jaeger traces.
Such an extension of the approach would result in multiple new challenges and almost
represent the development of a second architectural model extraction approach. Another
focus of the developed approach could be put on analyzing the HTTP methods of
requests to an operation to offer a more accurate extraction of operations from services
implemented with feathers.js or similar frameworks.
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Figure A.1.: Measured response times recorded during Experiment 2.2.
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Figure A.2.: Simulated response times created during Experiment 2.2.
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